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ABSTRACT 
 
Human migration is not a new phenomenon but present and future human-induced 
environmental changes pose new questions and challenges. In the coming years, both rapid and 
slow onset environmental changes will drive many people to migrate in search of improved 
security and livelihoods. Anthropogenic climate change in particular requires international 
institutions to determine how to best meet the needs of present and future migrants. I analyzed 
interviews with experts to identify institutional gaps for managing environmental migration and 
what potential, if any, the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage associated with 
climate change impacts (WIM) might contribute to filling these gaps. Using these interviews and 
literature, I propose a framework to assess the capacity of existing institutions to address the 
breadth of migrant needs. Then, I identify gaps and challenges in order to illuminate strategies 
for future solutions. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Profound Impacts of Climate Change 
 
 
 
Imagine you live on a tiny island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. After millennia of 
volcanic eruptions, coral reef development, and human settlement your home now sustains 
about 10,000 people who share your cultural identity. Your ancestors subsisted on coconuts from 
trees that lined the pristine beaches, fish that populated the surrounding waters, and taro that 
grew in the soil. Now climate change threatens the very existence of your home and culture. As 
sea levels rise, salt infiltrates the soil and threatens plant life. As the oceans absorb excess 
carbon, the surrounding coral can no longer house the once brilliant and diverse ocean life. In 
another 30 years, your home may be completely uninhabitable. 
 
Sadly, the above scenario is not hypothetical for residents of many small island developing 
states—Tuvalu being the commonly cited example in media discourse (CIA, n.d.; Harman, 2014; 
IPCC, 2014a; Morris, 2009). These isolated islanders, who contribute little to global greenhouse gas 
emissions, will pay profoundly for anthropogenic climate change. In the case of Tuvalu, many have 
already fled the island atolls and reefs, hoping to find a future in New 
 
Zealand or other nearby countries.  As one emigrant states: “[…] better we come here [New 
 
Zealand] to be safe” (Morris, 2009). While some people around the world hardly know this 
country exists, Tuvalu has recently become the poster child for ‘climate change refugees.’ Yet 
Tuvalu’s story, while perhaps the most dramatic example for the public, hardly represents the 
complex factors that will drive many around the world to abandon their homes due to 
environmental stress. 
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Environmental factors have influenced human migration patterns throughout history but 
only in the last few decades has it received scholarly attention (Piguet, 2013). A growing 
recognition of unsustainable practices has led to a surge in rapidly evolving research on the topic. 
Scholars are attempting to make sense of who environmental migrants are, what factors drive 
migratory decisions, and how to manage anticipated migration flows. Environmental migration 
eludes definition making any overarching conclusions or strategies difficult to apply. 
 
Environmental migration poses an important, future challenge for international actors to 
address as countries around the world already struggle to meet the needs of asylum seekers and 
other displaced peoples. The European Union for example is currently negotiating how to cope 
with a rapid influx of cross-border migration. The UN estimates that at least 350,000 documented 
migrants between January and August of 2015 have arrived in Europe-- a conservative number 
considering many remain undocumented (BBC, 2015a). Meeting the needs of so many threatens 
to diminish cohesive efforts as governments put “national interests above finding solutions as a 
community” claims the EU’s Parliament President Martin Schulz (BBC, 2015b). Viable solutions 
for global migration are an urgent need. Future solutions may need to mitigate competition 
amongst the interests of states and ultimately prevent human suffering as much as possible. 
 
1.2 Looking Forward: Climate Change Migration 
 
 
 
This research relies on two basic assumptions: 1) human-induced climate change exists 
and is getting worse, and 2) climate change will induce future migration flows. I ground these 
assumptions using the results identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in its assessment reports. 
 
In 1988, the United Nations Environmental Programme and the World Meteorological 
Organization created the IPCC in order to systematically assess all research related to climate 
change (IPCC, n.d.). Since then, the IPCC has published five in depth assessment reports. In 
 
2013, the IPCC published its latest report which covers three broad themes: 1) physical science, 
2 
 
2) impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, and 3) mitigation. Assessment reports synthesize 
thousands of articles and reports in order to spread a collective understanding of climate change 
and its impacts. However, the scientific community is constantly publishing new findings. The 
evolving nature of climate change knowledge means that any conclusions about climate change 
are subject to scrutiny and revision. In order to transparently convey its level of certainty in our 
current understanding of climate change, the IPCC qualifies any conclusions using two criteria: 
agreement amongst scientists and evidence type (IPCC, 2010). The IPCC denotes each on a 
scale of high/robust, medium, and low. Thus, the IPCC’s depth and detail of assessment makes 
it the world’s leading authority on what we know about climate change. 
 
Thus far, the IPCC concludes that “it is extremely likely that human influence has been 
the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20
th
 century” (IPCC, 2013, WGI, p. 
vi). Warming has increased over the last thirty years which scientists link to anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) (IPCC, 2013). Finally, scientists expect temperatures to 
increase in the next century “under all assessed emissions scenarios” making it “very likely” that 
extreme weather events will become more frequent and intense (IPCC, 2013, WGI, p. 10). In the 
context of migration, the IPCC concludes that extreme weather events increase migration for 
those who live in an effected area who are able to move, but extreme weather events also 
create immobility for the most vulnerable populations who lack the capacity to leave a 
devastated areas (IPCC, 2013). Migration is a general trend that will increase, yet the exact 
causes and outcomes vary greatly depending upon the circumstances and needs of a 
community. The IPCC’s fifth assessment report ultimately suggests that climate change impacts 
will continue to affect many populations, even under the most optimistic scenarios. 
 
1.3 Loss and Damage and the Warsaw International Mechanism 
 
 
 
Because of the international dimensions of climate change—such as cross-border migration 
flows and transboundary environmental and economic challenges—good reasons exist 
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to look closely at the UNFCCC as a potential institution for addressing the challenges of climate 
change-induced migration. As seen in the negotiating texts for loss and damage, conversations 
about migration have begun. The UNFCCC is the world-wide institution which countries use to 
negotiate climate change mitigation and adaptation. Each year, the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) acts as the negotiating body to the UNFCCC. These COPs lead to new practices and 
policies to deal with climate change. A growing concern amongst negotiators and other 
stakeholder parties is the loss and damage incurred by climate change impacts. No concrete 
definition for loss and damage exists, however, the Loss and Damage In Vulnerable Countries 
Initiative (2012) defines the term as “the actual and/or potential manifestation of climate impacts 
that negatively affect human and natural systems” (p. 2). The IPCC identifies a multitude of 
negative climate change effects related to migration. These impacts include diminished agency, 
health, and security for vulnerable populations, as well as increased pressures on urban centers 
(IPCC, 2013). A growing body of research qualifies these impacts as loss and damage (The Loss 
and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative, 2012; Warner, van der Geest, & Kreft, 2013). In 
2013, COP 19 established the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage associated 
with climate change impacts (WIM) as a tool to discuss and cope with loss and damage. 
 
The WIM is still in its infancy and negotiators have not identified any clear outcomes for 
the WIM to pursue. Currently, the Executive Committee for loss and damage has identified nine 
key action areas within its two year workplan. One of the nine action areas requires the WIM to 
address climate change induced migration and mobility (UNFCCC, 2014a). Yet, the only clear 
outcome goal thus far will be new knowledge about loss and damage. This amorphous state 
makes the WIM ripe for thoughtful intervention and consideration; thus, making the WIM a 
potential entry point for researching and discussing sustainable solutions for climate change 
migration. 
 
1.4 Climate Change Migration and Sustainability 
 
 
 
4 
 
A sustainability perspective is useful for understanding the significance of the challenges 
which lie ahead. Wiek et al. (2011) identify five key competencies which sustainability research 
aims to utilize: systems thinking, anticipatory, normative, strategic, and interpersonal. 
 
 Systems thinking: This competency describes the ability to consider multiple 
systems across different domains and scales (Wiek et al., 2011). Addressing 
environmental migration and climate change together inherently necessitates a 
systems thinking approach. The two focus areas demonstrate the complex web 
of interconnected challenges. As Popovski and Mundy (2012)explain “[v]ictims of 
climate change are victimized gradually by the accumulation over many years of 
ineffectual climate mitigation policies, by late and inadequate adaptation 
measures, by lack of sustainability approaches to lifestyles” (p. 8). Thus, a 
number of overlapping wicked problems contribute to victims of climate change, 
such as those who become displaced. Furthermore, displacement disturbs a new 
set of systems such as urban development, healthcare, and economic 
development. A sustainability approach thus accounts for the web of impacts and 
feedback loops which are apart of climate change and environmental migration.


 Anticipatory: This competency is the ability to analyze and craft ideas about the 
future (Wiek et al., 2011). A clear need for future problem solving drives this 
research. The concepts behind this research anticipate a growing problem and 
aims to provide thoughtful strategies to address future needs.

 Normative: This competence describes the ability to “collectively map, specify, 
apply, reconcile, and negotiate sustainability values, principles, goals, and 
targets” (Wiek et al., 2011, p. 209). Environmental migration and climate change 
both cause human suffering which disproportionately affects vulnerable 
communities. This research aims to consider the values associated with human
 
well-being in order to recommend solutions which will promote and protect those 
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values. Loss and damage in particular requires normative competence. Any future 
strategy may require trade-off and some loss and damage will occur along the way. 
Normative thinking considers how to best approach difficult trade-offs. 
 
 Strategic: This competence is the “ability to collectively design and implement 
interventions, transitions, and transformative governance strategies toward 
sustainability” (Wiek et al., 2011, p. 210). As mentioned throughout the previous 
competencies, the purpose of this research is to suggest strategies which 
address the complex challenges associated with both climate change and 
migration.

 Interpersonal: This competence is the “ability to motivate, enable, and facilitate 
collaborative and participatory sustainability research and problem solving” (Wiek 
et al., 2011, p.211). This research utilizes interpersonal skills by enabling experts 
in the field to share their findings and discuss concerns. While not all 
stakeholders are accounted for (i.e. migrants themselves), this research provides 
a window into the ideas and concepts put forth by one set of stakeholders—the 
experts.
 
Sustainability thinking thus outlines the tools necessary for developing effective future 
solutions. This research will utilize these tools to represent stakeholder needs and account for 
the values inherent in viable solutions for migration. 
 
1.5 Research Strategy 
 
 
In order to uncover pathways for future solutions to climate migration challenges, this 
research aims to explore how international organizations might meet the growing needs of 
climate change migrants. I chose to focus on two types of international organizations. First, I will 
examine how the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage due to climate change 
impacts (WIM) contributes to conversations about climate change-induced migration. Climate 
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change poses a shared challenge and responsibility to all countries (UNFCCC, 1992). The WIM 
falls within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and thus, 
operates under the collective agreements which Parties have already established. Exploring the 
WIM will demonstrate what role, if any, an international commitment to address climate change 
can contribute to environmental migration. Second, I will examine the capacity of migration-
centered international organizations to address the multitude of migrants’ needs. Evaluating each 
organization’s potential contribution to meeting the needs of future migrants will highlight any 
existing gaps and areas for future work. 
 
1.6 Research Strategy and Organization 
 
 
 
So, how might international organizations meet the growing needs of climate change 
migrants? In order to answer this question, I identify what role, if any, the WIM may contribute to 
supporting the needs of migrants. Then, I examine the work of other migration focused 
international organizations in order to assess what strategies they implement in order to meet the 
existing needs of migrants. I then identify gaps and needs which exist between the organizations 
in order to highlight areas where international organizations can focus new attention in order to 
meet the needs of migrants in coming years. 
 
Outline for the remainder of thesis: 
 
 
 Chapter Two identifies how scholars classify and understand environmental migration. 
I will discuss major debates within the field and provide a clearer picture as to what 
environmental migration entails within the context of climate change.

 Chapter Three discusses the origin of the WIM and its relationship to 
environmental migration.

 Chapter Four analyzes a series of expert interviews I conducted in order to develop a better 
understanding of the WIM and what it might contribute to discussions about climate
 
change migration. 
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 Chapter Five discusses a framework for understanding how international organizations 
currently act in order to meet the needs of environmental migrants. Using this 
framework, I identify problematic gaps in efforts and discuss potential solutions.

 Chapter Six concludes my findings. Here, I recommend how the WIM might best evolve 
in order to most effectively contribute to the existing work of other international 
organizations.
 
Any number of research approaches could address challenges associated with 
environmental migration. This project aims to illuminate what loss and damage discussions can 
contribute to decision-making and strategies for environmental migration. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Environmental Migration 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction: Environmental Migration in a Modern Era 
 
 
 
Environmental migration is not a new phenomenon. People throughout history have 
moved in search of fertile lands, reliable water sources, or to escape natural disasters. Ironically, 
a drop in sea-level over an extended period of climate change in the Late Pleistocene may have 
enabled humans to populate Pacific islands like Tuvalu 50,000 years ago (Pope & Terrell, 2008). 
However, environmental migration today questions the roles and responsibilities of each nation 
as people struggle to adapt to rapidly changing climates and ecosystems. Relationships between 
and within nation-states pose new concerns for migrants as well as their hosts. 
 
Unlike ancient environmental stressors which encouraged humans to search for new 
habitats, today’s causes for environmental migration are largely anthropogenic. Of course 
unprovoked disasters, like volcano eruptions and earthquakes continue to destroy homes, but 
development and climate change cause many instances of environmental deterioration. For 
instance, development projects can leak toxins into an environment or even destroy natural 
habitats by completely altering the landscape. Starting in 1964, Texaco began to extract oil from 
 
Ecuador’s Amazon forest but failed to properly handle toxic waste in the process (Jochnick & 
Rabaeus, 2010). The original inhabitants had, for thousands of years, lived entirely off the 
environmental resources available to them (Jochnick & Rabaeus, 2010). Yet oil development 
transformed the environment with roads, wells, and no less than 16.8 million gallons of spilled oil 
(Kimberling, 1994). Texaco’s poorly managed resource extraction “contaminated rivers and 
streams that provided vital water and fish to the indigenous communities” (Jochnick & Rabaeus, 
2010, 423). In another instance, China’s takeover of Tibet in 1950 led to coal mining and 
deforestation (Howard, 2010). Resource extraction and development in Tibet has led to soil 
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erosion, loss of biomass, and altered hydrologic systems (Downes, 2012; Xuefeng et at., 2007). 
The local communities that endure such forms of pollution and destruction are, at times, forced 
to migrate elsewhere. 
 
Climate change extends the environmental damage of development, making resource 
extraction and destruction a global challenge. While development can potentially reduce poverty 
and increase social services (UN, n.d.-b), it can also lead to harmful greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by enabling people to consume resources and energy. For example, 26% of global 
emissions come from burning energy sources like fossil fuels (Boden, Marland, & Andres, 2010). 
Furthermore, development increases emissions through land-use changes which destroy carbon 
sinks-- natural systems which store carbon (Foster, Clark, & York, 2010). Agriculture today 
contributes 14% of global emissions due to industrial methods of soil management (Boden, et 
al., 2010). However, traditional forms of agriculture can actually reduce emissions by storing 
carbon in the soil (Altieri, 2008). As greenhouse gasses (GHGs) accumulate in our shared 
atmosphere, global temperatures, weather patterns, and ocean acidity levels are changing at an 
alarming rate—faster than many plants and animals can adapt (IPCC, 2014a). These changes 
include slow-onset disasters like desertification and sea-level rise, and sudden disasters like 
hurricanes and floods. 
 
The environmental outcomes of climate change and development can significantly 
impact humans. In cases of soil salinization due to sea-level rise or extreme weather events like 
drought, subsistence farmers often cannot grow enough food to meet their needs. In Bangladesh 
a one meter rise in sea-level could ruin sixteen percent of the country’s rice production due to 
salinization and inundation and displace 13 million people (Huq, Ali, & Rahman, 1995). While 
these impacts alone are cause for serious concern, loss of life further demonstrates the 
devastating nature of climate change. In 2013, Typhoon Haiyan killed at least 6,300 people while 
displacing another 4.1 million people (USAID, 2014). While, typhoons existed long before 
anthropogenic climate change, scientist can link warming temperatures and sea-level rise to 
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Haiyan’s intensity (Różyński, Hung, & Ostrowski, 2009; Walsh et al., 2013). These examples of 
environmental devastation, unfortunately, are not exceptions. Societies around the world struggle 
to cope with environmental change and disasters. Yet, scholars and policy-makers should not 
forget that, while human history is wrought with death and destruction, the devastating 
environmental impacts we face today carry a legacy of injustice. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. The Origin of “Environmental Refugees” 
 
 
 
The term “environmental refugees” first entered political and academic discourse in 1985. 
 
That year, Essam El-Hinnawi, a research professor for the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP), published his foundational article titled: Environmental Refugees. Although this 
publication prompted the public to recognize the relationship between environmental disruption 
and human migration, the term was first coined by Lester Brown, the founder of the World Watch 
Institute, in 1976 (Rai, 2013). The concept of environmental refugees followed years of 
environmental devastation. 
 
The purpose of El-Hinnawi’s article was to bring light to those who were suffering from 
unintended consequences of infrastructure and economic development as well as others who 
faced environmental hazards outside of their control. The previous decades of development, 
like that in Ecuador and Tibet, put local communities in precarious positions. In 1972, the United 
 
Nations conference on the Human Environment declared that: “A point has been reached in 
history when we must shape our actions throughout the world with a more prudent care for their 
environmental consequences” (El-Hinnawi, 1985). This declaration was in response to unabated 
resource extraction. In the years following the UNEP’s declaration, El-Hinnawi noticed that local 
communities were migrating away from such degraded areas. Furthermore Africa, in the midst of 
decolonization and civil unrest, experienced extreme weather patterns (Anthony, 2009). The 
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Sahel endured severe drought and famine between 1969 and 1974 which drove “millions of 
farmers and nomads towards the cities” (Piguet, 2008, 1). Subsequent droughts created 
competition for wells in 1984 and 1985 (Anthony, 2009). El-Hinnawi recognized that, while the 
underlying drivers of environmental destruction may be diverse, many people were migrating 
to escape environmental pressures. He dubbed all of these people environmental refugees, 
highlighting that they shared common needs and warranted international recognition and 
assistance. 
 
El-Hinnawi took a humanitarian approach to address the needs of these people. However, 
his discussion was clearly framed from a development perspective, congruent with the focus of the 
UNEP (UNEP, n.d.).
1
 On the first page of his document, El-Hinnawi explained that 
 
“environmental concerns should not be a barrier to development but should be a part of the 
process, as development that is environmentally sound is also likely to be enduring and to 
avoid unforeseen and unwelcome side effects” (1985, p. 1). This illustrates his understanding 
that environmentally related migration was due to poorly planned development. This statement 
accompanied a photograph of an Indian woman sitting inside of a concrete water pipe with the 
caption: “Sheer lack of development may degrade the quality of life more than the adverse 
environmental impacts of development” (El-Hinnawi, 1985). El-Hinnawi did not intend to blame 
development itself; rather he argued that people need better forms of development in order to 
improve both the human and environmental condition. 
 
2.3 The Original Refugees 
 
 
 
The term environmental refugee clearly built upon the internationally recognized concept of 
refugee that had developed decades prior. The term environmental refugee attempted to simply 
expand how scholars and policymakers understand the drivers of involuntary migration. 
 
1
 The UNEP’s stated mission is “To provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the 
environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life 
without compromising that of future generations.” Typically the focus is on environmental 
protection, where humanitarian efforts are left in the hands of other agencies.  
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Following the wake of WWII, the world saw unprecedented change and restructuring. Among 
these changes was most notably the formation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 (UN, n.d.-a). 
After this intergovernmental body organized itself, additional sub agencies formed to assist those 
affected by WWII. An important body created during this period was the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM). Developed in 1951, and known initially as the Provisional 
Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), this 
organization has and continues to play a significant role in assisting and understanding migration 
as it relates to environmental stressors (IOM, n.d.-c). Also worth noting is the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which formed in 1950 and ratified the UN Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 (UNHCR, 1967, n.d.-c). The UNHCR’s initial purpose 
was to support those who lost their homes after the tragedies of WWII. The Convention, as it is 
referred to, defined a refugee as someone who: "owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" (UNHCR, 1967). 
 
The 1951 definition targeted only people displaced in Eastern Europe prior to 1951 and 
included a specific definition of persecution. The UNHCR provided a framework to protect those 
who were displaced or whose countries were undergoing transition after WWII (UNHCR, n.d.-a). 
Furthermore, the convention obliged host states to provide some form of protection for the 
recently displaced persons (Gorman, 2000). The Convention, at the time, was a temporary 
mechanism, but people continued to need assistance (Gatrell, 2013). 
 
In 1954, the UNHCR broadened the Convention’s scope to include people displaced after 
 
1951 and instituted a Program of Permanent Solutions (Gorman, 2000). In 1967, the UNHCR 
again broadened the definition of refugee to encompass non-Europeans affected by conflicts 
other than WWII, namely Africans caught in the violent wake of decolonization. In the two years 
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leading up to the 1967 Protocol, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Ethiopia all experienced civil 
wars and conflicts after de-colonization (Gorman, 2000). 
 
Given the fact that the UNHCR had grown to serve purposes beyond that of WWII, El-
Hinnawi expected that people forced to leave their homes for a variety of reasons would continue to 
challenge the existing definition of refugees and expand the roles of the UNHCR since the 
 
“definition of a refugee is constantly evolving” (El-Hinnawi, 1985). His report called attention to 
alternative humanitarian crises and persecution beyond war. He supports his claim by stating 
that “[t]here is no comprehensive international definition of a ‘refugee’” and “new situations kept 
arising that generated additional refugees” (El-Hinnawi, 1985). Perhaps this was also influenced 
by his geographical location. El-Hinnawi was located in Nairobi, Kenya, which, as mentioned, 
experienced great turmoil leading to the 1967 Protocol. He supported his argument that “the 
definition of a refugee now extends beyond the persecuted individual to whole groups of people 
fleeing from dangerous circumstances” by referencing the Organization of African Unity’s 
 
Convention on Refugees from 1969 (El-Hinnawi, 1985). This highlights his logic that including 
environmental reasons within the definition of ‘refugee’ was the next step of inclusion. 
 
El-Hinnawi defined environmental refugees as: “people who have been forced to leave 
their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental 
disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously 
affected the quality of their life.” (El-Hinnawi,1985). This was significant because it included those 
who were adversely affected by development as well as those who experienced natural disasters 
like earthquakes or volcano eruptions. Importantly, climate change had not yet entered the 
conversation. 
 
El-Hinnawi built onto his simplistic, all-encompassing definition of environmental refugees 
by distinguishing three broad categories: temporarily displaced, permanently displaced, and those 
who migrate due to prolonged deterioration of their resource base (slow onset disasters, rather 
 
than sudden) (El-HInnawi, 1985). He also recognized that migration itself impacts the social and 
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environmental landscape of their new land. This underscored the need for states to address the 
phenomenon in order to mitigate damage caused by migrants themselves (Ho, 1999). Yet, El-
Hinnawi did not suggest any specific policy actions and did not place blame on any governing 
body or development process. Overall, he took a broad, politically neutral stance on the issue. 
After El-Hinnawi’s Environmental Refugees was published, scholars began to immediately work 
toward understanding who these people were and why they were (supposedly) moving. 
 
2.4 Climate Change Enters Environmental Migration Discourse 
 
 
 
Jodi Jacobson published the next significant article to address this phenomenon, entitled: 
 
Environmental refugees: a yardstick of habitability (1988). Jacobson’s assessment introduced 
climate change as an important driver of environmental migration. As before, Jacobson focused 
on both anthropogenic environmental degradation and natural disasters but the advent of climate 
change expanded the types of disasters afoot. Inundation from sea level rise took center-stage 
as scholars began to recognize the long-term effects of industrial development and fossil fuel 
energy systems. At the time, Jacobson estimated that a one-meter rise in sea-level could drive 
50 million people from their homes (1988). Shortly after, USA Today helped popularize this 
phenomenon by publishing an article entitled “Environmental Refugees,” which drew on 
Jacobson’s report, especially as it related to climate change (USA Today, 1989). 
 
Climate change soon took over environmental refugee literature as scholars and policy-
makers began to understand global changes to weather patterns and ecosystems. In the same 
year as Jacobson’s report, the UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) formed 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in order “to provide the world with a clear 
scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental 
and socio-economic impacts”(IPCC, n.d.). The IPCC published its first assessment report in 1990 
(IPCC, 1990). This report comprehensively reviewed scientific data associated with climate 
change “with a view of formulating realistic response strategies” (IPCC, n.d.). The Executive 
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Summary of the First Assessment Report (FAR) included a specific section on climate impacts on 
human settlements.
2
 It stated that “the most vulnerable human settlements are those especially 
exposed to natural hazards, e g [sic] coastal or river flooding, severe drought, landslides, severe 
wind storms and tropical cyclones” (IPCC, 1990). The IPCC cited Jacobson’s recent article when 
stating that sea level rise could “render some island countries uninhabitable, [and] displace tens 
of millions of people” (IPCC, 1990). While Tuvalu typically comes to mind, numerous other island 
countries stand to suffer significant land loss such as Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, the Marshall 
islands and the Maldives (Harman, 2014). The First Assessment Report also drew attention to 
the issues of resettlement, focusing on how cities could experience significant challenges due to 
large numbers of rural migrants resettling in urban areas. Such stressors, the report argued, were 
“burdens on existing housing, medical care facilities, and various essential urban infrastructure 
and services” (IPCC, 1990). The report specifically addressed health impacts, suggesting that 
there could be insufficient services in the form of access to healthcare and sanitary conditions, 
which could lead to the spread of existing diseases, exposure to new diseases (for both 
established residents and newcomers), and psychological strain. These impacts, as defined in 
the FAR, still concern urban planners today (Pickett et al., 2013). 
 
Following the IPCC’s 1990 assessment report, Norman Myers, a prominent scholar on 
the issues of environmental refugees published two articles in 1993, titled: “Environmental 
refugees in a globally warming world” and “Ultimate security: the environmental basis of 
political stability.” Myers comes from a background in biodiversity conservation and approached 
the environmental refugee conversations from an environmentalist perspective while using a 
humanitarian appeal to policy makers. The impacts of Myers’ publications and the IPCC’s 
assessment within migration studies alludes to a shift in perspective, such that climate change 
became the primary concern for addressing environmentally induced migration rather than 
development as El-Hinnawi first framed the conversation. 
 
2
 This is not to imply that human settlements were considered of greater importance than other climate 
change impacts. The assessment report was meant to be comprehensive and surveyed numerous issues.  
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Growing interest and concern for environmental migration prompted the publication of 
 
Myers’ and Kent’s “Environmental Exodus: An environmental crisis in the global arena” (1995). In 
the assessment, Myers and Kent (1995) argued that policymakers and scholars need an 
overarching definition for environmental refugees which they can understand and widely accept. 
The multitude of drivers-- such as volcano eruptions, industrial accidents, soil depletion, and sea-
level rise-- rendered academic and policy discussions confusing and difficult to manage. Ideally, 
an accepted and clear definition would move the conversations of environmental migration 
beyond technical arguments. In this vein, Myers and Kent (1995) advocated for environmental 
refugees to include: 
 
[P]ersons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands 
because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, 
deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, also natural disasters 
such as cyclones, storm surges and floods. In face of these environmental threats, 
people feel they have no alternative but to seek sustenance elsewhere, whether within 
their own countries or beyond and whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis 
(p. 18). 
 
They further argued for a clear distinction between those who migrate primarily due to 
environmental decline and “have no alternative” and those “with moderate though tolerable 
economic circumstances at home [who] feel drawn by opportunity for a better economic life 
elsewhere” (Myers & Kent, 1995, p. 17). While they recognize creating such a division poses 
challenges due to imbricating motivations of migrants, they claim this distinction “matters a 
good deal as concerns our institutional responses to them” (Myers & Kent, 1995, p. 18). While 
this claim is not necessarily false, their eight policy recommendations do not require 
differentiation amongst migrants other than “an expanded approach” to include environmental 
refugees under the Refugee Convention or a new institution which would presumably exclude 
those who may have the option to remain in their homelands (Myers & Kent, 1995, p. 9). 
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Myers and Kent not only propose a new definition for environmental refugees but also project 
scenarios for 2010 and 2025 which illustrate potential for environmentally induced migration. Their 
vulnerability analysis examines specific areas of concern, including: food and agriculture, water 
deficits, deforestation, desertification, population growth, urbanization, unemployment, poverty, and 
extreme weather phenomena (Myers & Kent, 1995). In this manuscript, Myers and Kent make no 
aggregate predictions for future migration numbers, stating that “estimates for environmental refugee 
totals [are] not feasible due to the many variables and uncertainties at issue” (1995, p. 125) However, 
Myers would later predict potential for 50 million environmental refugees by 2010, citing 
“Environmental Exodus” as the source of his estimates 
 
(Myers, 2002, 2005). While perhaps well intentioned, Myers’ and Kent’s assessment opened the 
door for wide disagreement amongst scholars over the next decade as they scrutinize his 
migration projection methods and alarmist tone. 
 
 
 
2.5 Migrants versus Refugees 
 
 
 
Shortly after the predictions of 1995, scholars began to pick apart points of contention 
surrounding the concept of environmental refugee. First, not all accepted El-Hinnawi’s assertion 
that the concept of refugee status was fluid or open to interpretation. This is not, however, to 
suggest that scholars and international agreements have always upheld a mutual and stable 
perception of what a refugee is or should be. Scholars and governing bodies generally uphold 
the qualifying factors of “persecution” and “outside of their home state.” Yet, these qualifications 
are subject to interpretation as well (Zetter, 2007). The idea that they must be living in a host 
country also raises concerns for the treatment of internally displaced persons. There is no clear 
course of action on behalf of the international bodies or NGOs when people remain in their home 
country. For example, “Darfur, Nepal and Colombia illustrate […] the victims of persecution and, 
largely neglected, intra-state wars of attrition, remain in-country” (Zetter, 2007, 177). For these 
 
reasons, scholars have regularly combined refugees and forced migrants into the same 
18 
 
conversation, allowing room to discuss important issues or instances, like internally displaced 
persons who do not fit neatly into a refugee box because they have not crossed international 
borders. Yet, environmental factors pushed the boundaries that qualify someone as a refugee 
too far in the eyes of some migration scholars. 
 
There are a number of reasons scholars disagreed and continue to question the nature 
of environmental refugees. However, many of these issues become a matter of technicalities. 
Much contention could be allayed by clearer definitions. But a clear definition serves little 
purpose. As Myers and Kent (1995) suggested, a clear definition could create support and 
develop understanding of who environmental refugees are. Clearly, there has been much 
scholarship on the phenomenon, enough to identify the complexities of the issue. In fact, a clear 
definition may only serve to exclude some who fall just outside the definition, much like forced 
migrants are to refugees. Many forced migrants could arguably fall into the traditional category of 
refugee but states are unwilling to accept any cases that are not clearly defined, as this could 
increase their obligation to provide assistance. A definition could serve to gain political clout as 
the Convention did for refugees. However, refugee scholars suggest that there is a growing 
number of traditional refugees yet fewer are being granted asylum (Gatrell, 2013). If fewer 
traditional refugees are managing to obtain political asylum or assistance, then there seems to be 
little hope for a clear definition achieving protection for those who are environmentally displaced. 
 
While migration scholars may always debate definitions or focus on certain characteristics, 
recent scholarship typically accepts that environmental migrants are not refugees. 
 
Similarly, the ‘environmental refugee’ remains an outlier for refugee scholars. Zetter argues that 
the humanitarian focused efforts to help all people have in fact been detrimental to 
understanding the nuances that shape one’s understanding of refugee (Zetter, 2007). The 
concept of an environmental refugee as El-Hinnawi and subsequent scholars define it, clashes 
with the traditional understanding of refugees in regards to three specific criteria: persecution, 
crossing international borders, and having no choice but to flee. Environmental migrants do not 
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necessarily endure persecution for religious or political reasons, and often times they migrate 
within the borders of their home country. Also, scholars have no standard method to determine if 
environmental migrants have choices in whether they stay or flee, especially in the context of 
slow onset disasters. If a rural farmer’s crop production slowly declines due to desertification, at 
what point is he or she forced to move? While Bates (2002) attempts to define a continuum of 
migrants and refugees, her definition remains vague and no other scholar provides a more 
convincing set of criteria. Scholars typically relinquish attempts to make overarching definitions 
and accept that no clear answer readily exists. 
 
Still, policy-makers could choose to create a new definition of refugee to incorporate a 
wider set of people in need, but this solution seems highly unlikely. The Refugee Convention 
imposes obligations upon states to protect refugees who seek asylum within their borders. This 
provides little incentive, beyond a humanitarian concern, for policy-makers to include more people 
in the refugee category. In fact, some agencies are trying to limit their responsibility for those who 
do meet the definition. As McNamara (2007) demonstrates, while the UNEP initially supported the 
term environmental refugee, today the agency limits its rhetoric to environmental damage caused 
by refugees and forced migrants. Even the UNHCR, which is supposed to be politically neutral, 
remains subject to political and economic forces. Forsythe describes this conundrum, stating: 
 
 
 
“[s]ince the UNHCR is dependent on voluntary contributions from about a dozen 
states, along with the European Union, question arises as to whether the agency is 
partial to those states and their intergovernmental organizations […] does the agency 
take its protective decisions so as to minimize irritation on the part of those who pay for 
more than 95% of its budget?” (2001, 26). 
 
In 2012, the UNHCR had an annual budget of US $4.3 billion (UNHCR, n.d.-b). While the 
agency manages to help millions, their annual budget may fall short as the agency expects 
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700,000 new asylum claims in 2014-- the most applications for any given year in the past 
two decades (UNHCR, 2014a). 
 
While the cost of refugee aid already represents a disincentive to states expanding much 
needed services, states may also indirectly benefit from forced migrants. Limiting the definition of 
refugee allows states to easily deny residency to desperate migrants. Thus, migrants often take 
jobs that allow them to stay unnoticed by governments but in return, they often do not make 
enough money to meet their needs. For example, migrant farm workers in California who supply 
the country with fruits and vegetables, are one of the most food insecure populations in the US 
(Brown & Getz, 2011). The workers often do not know their rights or fear deportation too much to 
risk pursuing social services (Brown & Getz, 2011). This trend prompted the Human Rights 
Council to appoint a special rapporteur to defend the rights of migrants in 1999 (UN, 2013b). 
 
2.6 Migration Projections 
 
 
 
Disagreements continue about migration projections, particularly in opposition to the 
methods used by Myers and Kent in Environmental Exodus (1995). The document projected 
there would be 50 million environmentally displaced persons by the year 2010. However, actual 
numbers are difficult to calculate but populations in the supposedly uninhabitable areas have 
grown (Bojanowski, 2011). Still, Environmental Exodus is the most often cited work for migration 
projections. Few other projections are ever used when discussing environmental migration, save 
 
Christian Aid’s prediction that one billion people will be displaced by 2050 (Christian Aid, 2007). 
 
Scholars blamed his failed projections on a variety of reasons. Some scholars suggest Myers’ 
predictions were based on a lack of academic rigor (Black, 2001; Kibreab, 1997; Piguet, 2008). 
 
As Scholar Stephan Castles expressed in an interview, Myers “simply took a map of the world, 
worked out what areas would be inundated if the sea rose, say 50cm, and then simply assumed that 
all the people affected by this sea level rise would have to migrate” (Barnes, 2013). Myers assumed 
that people would physically and permanently relocate in the wake of an environmental 
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disaster, yet people do not always move after an environmental disaster. Often times they will 
return (if they ever left) after a few months (Black, 2001). Also, many of these disasters occur 
in the poorest regions of the world where some people simply do not have the means, ability, 
or desire to relocate (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010). 
 
These realizations fueled disagreement and skepticism as to the enormity and 
significance that future environmental impacts will have on human migration. Some accused 
Myers of exaggerating the impacts as a scare tactic, an effort to gain attention to a problem that is 
far less serious than claimed (Black, 2001; Kibreab, 1997; Piguet, 2008; Tacoli, 2009). Black 
especially calls attention to Myers’s background in ecology rather than migration or refugee 
studies to undercut his credibility, claiming that Myers sought to push his own agenda for 
environmental conservation (Black, 2001). 
 
While media may still quote Myers’s and Kent’s 1995 projections, scholars hardly 
recognize their forecasts for 2010 and 2050 as credible estimates. One reason is that Myers’s 
and Kent’s projection for 2010 supposedly surpassed the number of actual migrants for that 
same year. They estimated there would be 50 million environmental migrants by 2010 (Myers & 
Kent, 1995). While many scholars ridicule this estimate, no one has actually supplied an accurate 
number of how many environmental migrants, as Myers and Kent defined them, existed in 2010.
3
 
 
Furthermore, no academic since Myers has attempted to estimate the broad scope of potential 
environmental migration patterns. Migration may simply be too difficult to predict and other 
scholars are not willing to risk making faulty forecasts. Yet, Myers’s publications may indeed 
deserve some amount of scorn. While Myers attempted to inspire environmental conservation, 
Piguet (2013) aptly warns that such alarmist predictions can create xenophobia among states. 
The US-Mexico border illustrates this potential. The United States, between 2006 and 2009, 
 
 
 
3
 While no accurate comparison exists, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that 27 
million people on average were displaced each year between 2008 and 2013. This figure includes those 
who return home (Yonetani, 2014).  
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spent $2.4 billion to build 670 miles of steel barrier to separate itself from Mexico (Sais, 
2013) rather than investing in conservation or poverty relief efforts. 
 
2.7 Migration Response Strategies 
 
 
 
Myers’s implication that states should prevent migration further fueled disagreements 
between scholars. In some instances, migration could be an acceptable form of adaptation to an 
environmental hazard, similar to the spread of humans throughout history (Bardsley & Hugo, 
 
2010; Barnett & O’Neill, 2012; Black, 2001). For example, rural families will often have one 
or more members find work elsewhere to compensate for seasonal variability and poor crop 
production (Tacoli, 2009). This has the potential to alleviate poverty. The International 
 
Organization for Migration (IOM) states that “migration reduces poverty on an extraordinary scale” 
 
(UN, 2013a). 
 
 
However, scholars questioned how much of a choice people really have when they leave 
their home. Choice plays a significant role in understanding migration as a positive adaptation 
strategy for those who may migrate due to an environmental disaster or because they can no longer 
afford to live off the land. In fact, successful adaptation strategies in general depend on a person’s 
ability to have multiple choices at hand (Doria, Boyd, Tompkins, & Adger, 2009). It may be prudent for 
scholars and policymakers to consider a migrant’s choice when suggesting migration as a solution. 
For instance, migration does not necessarily improve migrants’ sense of well-being as they are “less 
likely to feel happy or experience enjoyment” and more likely “to be unemployed or underemployed” 
relative to their native-born neighbors (IOM, 2013a). 
 
Furthermore, migration may alleviate some struggles but urban growth poses additional 
challenges. Although not all migrants move to cities (Tacoli, 2009), urban growth poses considerable 
environmental, societal, and health risks. As the IPCC notes, rapid growth poses risks of 
communicable diseases and burdens public services like healthcare facilities (IPCC, 
 
2013). These logistical and health challenges may also stimulate racial or xenophobic tensions 
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within the community if people perceive migration as having a negative impact. In areas where 
the established community feels economic conditions are “poor” or “fair,” they are less likely to 
view migration positively (IOM, 2015a). Furthermore, cities fuel consumption behaviors which 
increase GHG emissions. While a city’s design does not inherently increase environmental 
damage, cities encourage people to consume three times as much as their rural counterparts 
(Rees & Wackernagel, 2008). Furthermore, the flow of precious phosphorous and other 
resources to cities from the countryside disrupts both rural and urban ecological systems. 
Instead of vital nutrients returning to the soil for future plant growth, they pollute waterways and 
create dead zones (Foster et al., 2010; Rees & Wackernagel, 2008). Although cities can adapt 
strategies to mitigate these effects (Pickett et al., 2013), policymakers should consider the full 
scale of challenges related to migration. 
 
Furthermore, scholars tend to exclude environmental migrants from developed countries, 
unless they are indigenous communities like Canada’s Inuit population. Two reasons may 
contribute to this understanding. First, climate change impacts tend to cause less devastating 
damage in developed countries (Kolstad et al., 2014). However, this claim does not to suggest 
that environmental stressors never cause populations to migrate in developed countries. 
Hurricane Katrina is a notable example. After Katrina struck, at least 374,000 displaced persons 
in shelters and various other forms of housing (Grier, 2005). Second, developed countries tend 
to have social safety nets which poorer countries do not. While Hurricane Katrina still sparked 
racial and political concerns, the surviving victims likely had access to better social services than 
their developing country counter-parts (Kelman, 2007; Powell, 2007). 
 
2.8 Current Institutions and Possible Solutions 
 
 
 
While scholars and institutions struggle to find the most viable path forward for 
environmental migrants, these vulnerable communities currently rely on several different 
avenues to meet their needs. The IOM, for example, provides technical support and operational 
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assistance to governing bodies and produces relevant research pertaining to many categories of 
migrants, including environmental migrants (IOM, n.d.-d). Despite some of the IOM’s proactive 
efforts, a great deal of today’s assistance for environmental migrants occurs in reaction to major 
disasters. A number of institutions provide humanitarian relief during and after disasters such as: 
Oxfam, Red Cross, USAID, OCHA, and the IOM, as well as other local, regional, and disaster-
specific organizations like Haiti Relief Fund. USAID, for example, has allocated $3.1 billion 
dollars to provide “life-saving responses” in 2016 (USAID, n.d.). While these agencies provide 
invaluable services and save lives, investing in mitigation or adaptation techniques to minimize 
the need for such emergency aid may also save lives while preventing traumatic experiences and 
disorder. Furthermore, proactive measures may also provide support to a broader spectrum of 
environmental migrants, rather than focusing on those who migrate due to sudden-onset 
disasters. Yet, proactive efforts are no panacea. Even if governments enact endless strategies to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change impacts, some vulnerable communities will likely endure 
disasters or other forms of loss in the future (if not already). For this reason, the Warsaw 
International Mechanism poses an alternative, intergovernmental approach to support 
environmental migrants. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Loss and Damage and the UNFCCC 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Climate change poses numerous risks to vulnerable populations and is a driver for 
migration. People around the world stand to lose their homes, livelihoods, or even life due to 
climate change impacts. For this reason, loss and damage has become an important workstream 
within the UNFCCC. In December of 2013, COP 19 established the WIM in an effort to increase 
action to address loss and damage. Examining both what loss and damage is and how the 
UNFCCC came to create the WIM will open space to discuss what the WIM is capable of 
contributing to migration conversations. 
 
3.2 Understanding Loss and Damage 
 
 
 
The concept of loss and damage as it relates to climate change is gaining traction within 
the international community. Empirical research now shows that vulnerable communities around 
the world already experience loss and damage due to climate change impacts (Warner et al., 
2013). Although evidence supports the existence of loss and damage, international agencies and 
fora, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), do not support a 
firm definition for loss and damage. Bread for the World, EED-Church Development Service, and 
 
DanChurchAid claim that “[a] precise definition of loss and damage must be quite encompassing 
and inclusive taking into consideration its various aspects […]” (2012, p. 2). Researchers are still 
working to grasp the breadth of causes and impacts associated with loss and damage, thus no 
definition at this time can confidently meet such standards. As the Loss and Damage in 
 
Vulnerable Countries Initiative explains, “a precise definition may not be necessary and in fact 
may even be counter-productive at this early stage” (2012, p. 2). An institutionalized definition 
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which is premature may fail to effectively guide institutions and inform policy. Still, the Loss and 
Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative proposes the following working definition in order to 
facilitate discussions: 
 
Loss and Damage represents the actual and/or potential manifestation of climate 
impacts that negatively affect human and natural systems. 
 
“Damage” can be seen as negative impacts that can be repaired or restored (such as 
windstorm damage to the roof of a building, or damage to a coastal mangrove forest 
from coastal surges which affect villages). 
 
“Loss” can be characterized as negative impacts that cannot be repaired or restored 
 
(such as loss of geologic freshwater sources related to glacial melt or desertification, 
or loss of culture or heritage associated with potential population redistribution away 
from areas that become less habitable over time with climate change) (2012, p. 2). 
 
We may further define loss and damage based on the type of impacts they cause— 
namely economic and non-economic. The UNFCCC describes economic losses as “the loss of 
resources, goods and services that are commonly traded in markets” (2013). Economic losses 
more closely represent the above definition of “damage” described by the Loss and Damage in 
 
Vulnerable Countries Initiative since economic losses are quantifiable and can potentially be 
restored. Conversely, non-economic losses are not traded in markets, making them difficult to 
assess (UNFCCC, 2013b). Non-economic losses include “losses of, inter alia, life, health, 
displacement and human mobility territory, cultural heritage, indigenous/local knowledge, 
biodiversity and ecosystem services” (UNFCCC, 2013b). A single climate change-induced 
disaster may result in both economic and non-economic forms of loss and damage. For example, 
research in Burkina Faso shows that pastoralists often must sell livestock at a drastically reduced 
rate during drought (Warner et al., 2013). Economic loss occurs in the devaluation of their cattle. 
Over time, pastoralists may also incur non-economic loss in the forms of cultural identity and 
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lifestyle as they transition to other sources of income and/or lose their herds altogether. Many of 
these pastoralists are Fulani, “for whom pastoralism is much more than just a source of food or 
income: it is a way of life” (Warner et al., 2013, p. 41). Distinguishing between economic and 
non-economic loss and damage highlights the breadth of challenges resulting from climate 
change and the need for a wide variety of solutions including prevention. 
 
The roles of climate change mitigation and adaptation further impact how scholars and 
negotiators acknowledge and address loss and damage. Avoidable loss and damage refers to 
potential loss and damage which mitigation and adaptation efforts prevent from ever happening 
(Pinninti, 2014). Residual loss and damage is that which “remains once all feasible measures 
(especially adaptation and mitigation) have been implemented” (UNFCCC, 2012, p. 20). 
Recognition that some loss and damage is unavoidable and already occurring has led the 
UNFCCC to increase its efforts to address loss and damage. However, climate change 
negotiators and stakeholders have no clear strategy to address loss and damage within an 
intergovernmental forum such as the UNFCCC, which already struggles to achieve its 
mitigation and adaptation goals. 
 
3.3 History and Foundations of the UNFCCC 
 
 
 
The United Nations created the UNFCCC as a means to facilitate climate change 
negotiations on a global platform. While the UNFCCC officially began in 1992, earlier efforts to 
manage and understand climate change contributed to its inception. Scientists’ growing interests 
on the climatic effects of carbon dioxide during the 1960’s led to two conferences: the Study of 
Critical Environmental Problems in 1970 and the Study on Man’s Impact on Climate in 1971 
 
(Paterson, 1996). Climate change science continued to grow and contributed to the broader, 
international recognition of humanity’s negative impacts on the environment. In 1987, the UN 
published Our Common Future, claiming that “[h]umanity has the ability to make development 
sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
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future generations to meet their own needs” (UN, 1987b). The same year, UN Parties to the 
Vienna Convention implemented the Montreal Protocol to limit emissions of substances which 
deplete or modify the ozone layer (UN, 1987a). In 1988, the UNEP and the World Meteorological 
Organization created the IPCC (as discussed in Chapter 1) in order to collectively and 
systematically assess climate change science. These events (and many more) led to the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The 
Rio Earth Summit-- the UNCED’s common name-- gave birth to three complementary 
conventions: the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention to Combat 
Desertification, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, n.d.). The 
UNFCCC is now the primary international mechanism for addressing climate change. 
 
The UNFCCC addresses climate change by promoting cooperation amongst Parties in 
a variety of ways. Mitigation, one of the primary objectives of the UNFCCC, encompasses 
several key strategies to promote cooperation and ultimately reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
As stated in the Convention: 
 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentration in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is 
not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner. (1992, article 2) 
 
With this objective in mind, the UNFCCC commits Parties to periodically record and publish 
levels of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHGs), share scientific and technical 
knowledge, and promote sustainable management of GHG sinks and reservoirs (1992, article 4). 
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These commitments represent cooperation amongst the Parties in order to ultimately prevent 
as much harm as possible. 
 
The UNFCCC further promotes cooperation by outwardly acknowledging the individual 
roles and capabilities of each Party, particularly in regard to Parties’ levels of development. The 
 
Convention notes that “the largest share of historical and current global emissions of 
greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in 
developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in 
developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs” (1992). This 
acknowledgement draws attention to both global inequity and the interdependent nature of each 
Party’s actions. This statement invokes a sense of responsibility between parties, particularly on 
behalf of developed states. The UNFCCC further elaborates on the concepts of responsibility 
and global interdependence by “acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for 
the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and 
appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions” (1992). 
 
Cooperation amongst Parties is not only a responsibility, but an important interest for 
everyone. While selfish or short-term interests may tempt developed countries from effectively 
cooperating, “global climate change will spare no one […] in the long term” (Kjellen, 2006, p. ix). 
In this regard, the Parties recognize that each holds a common responsibility to prevent and 
manage the negative effects of climate change; but given the vast diversity among the Parties, 
including their contribution to climate change, their responsibilities and respective capabilities 
are different. 
 
The UNFCCC utilizes six key thematic areas which collectively work toward achieving 
cooperation amongst Parties: mitigation, adaptation, technology, finance, capacity building, and 
transparency. Mitigation and adaptation encourage action to reduce the negative impacts of 
 
“anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (article 2). Whereas, finance, technology, 
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and capacity building are means to achieve mitigation and adaptation (Briner, Kato, Konrad, & 
Hood, 2014). Transparency ideally permeates all of the above in order to make the UNFCCC to 
function effectively and efficiently. These thematic areas represent a wide range of institutions 
and arrangements which the UNFCCC uses to combat climate change. 
 
The UNFCCC primarily negotiates the terms of new and existing institutions and 
arrangements at an annual meeting called the Conference of the Parties (COP). Individual work 
groups and bodies hold smaller meeting throughout the year. Each COP provides an 
opportunity for all 195 Parties to participate in negotiations and interact with stakeholder 
observers. These Conferences lead to key steps in addressing mitigation and adaptation. 
 
3.3.1 Mitigation 
 
 
Mitigation plays a fundamental role in the UNFCCC’s efforts to reduce the harmful 
impacts of climate change. The Kyoto Protocol, while not adopted by all Parties to the 
Conference, signified the first major step in mitigation by committing developed countries to 
reduce their emissions. Parties must primarily reduce their emissions through national efforts but 
may also use three international market-based avenues: International Emissions Trading, Clean 
Development Mechanism, and Joint Implementation (UNFCCC, 1998). The Protocol proved to 
be a lengthy process; it was adopted in 1997, came into force in 2005, and the first commitment 
period lasted from 2008 to 2012. In 2012, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol 
established a new commitment period to last from 2013 until 2020. Despite the arduous past and 
present efforts to reduce emissions, the IPCC (2014) claims that GHG emissions increased by 
2.2% per year between 2000 and 2010. Mitigation remains an important approach to addressing 
climate change, yet the continuous increase in emissions combined with present-day climate 
change impacts, has encouraged the COP to consider adaptation efforts as equally important as 
mitigation. 
 
3.3.2 Adaptation 
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Adaptation to climate change seeks to reduce the negative impacts of climate change. 
Adaptation is a broad label to describe a variety of actions. According to Adger, Paavola, and 
Huq (2006), adaptation may take form as policy measures, investments in infrastructure and 
technologies, and behavioral changes. The UNFCCC has, since its inception, recognized a need 
to understand adaptation and implement effective strategies. Article 4 of the Convention commits 
all Parties to “facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change” (UNFCCC, 1992, para 1, b). The 
COP has taken several key steps over a number of years in order to progressively address 
adaptation needs. In 2001, the COP instituted the Least Developed Countries Work 
 
Programme in order to support “developing country Parties to pursue the specific activities most 
appropriate to their unique national circumstances” (Dec. 5/CP.7). This decision gave a voice to 
the most vulnerable countries and pathways for them to address their individual adaptation 
needs. In 2005, the COP formally acknowledged that it needed to grow its body of research in 
order to properly address the adaptation needs of all Parties. Decision 2 of COP 11 enacted a 
five-year work plan, known as the Nairobi Work Programme, which claimed that “[…]adaptation 
to climate change and its adverse effects is of high priority for all countries and that developing 
countries, especially the least developed countries and small island developing States, are 
particularly vulnerable” (UNFCCC, 2006). 
 
In 2010, the COP again recognized a growing need for adaptation. The Cancun 
Adaptation Framework marked the most significant and broad step in developing a framework to 
address adaptation. The COP established the Cancun Adaptation Framework “with the objective 
of enhancing action on adaptation, including through international cooperation and coherent 
consideration of matters relating to adaptation under the Convention” (UNFCCC, 2011, dec 1, 
para 13). This framework incorporates four workstreams in order to address the breadth of needs 
required to enhance action. The workstreams include: Loss and Damage, the Nairobi Work 
Programme, National Adaptation Plans, and National Adaptation Programmes of Action. While 
mitigation may have been the original intent of the UNFCCC (Schipper, 2006), the COP clearly 
 
recognize adaptation as a primary objective.  
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3.4 Loss and Damage 
 
 
 
Loss and damage from climate change impacts has only recently received serious 
recognition by the COP, even though Parties were cognizant of its potential much earlier. During 
the development of the UNFCCC, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) promoted “an 
agreement on a mechanism to address the risk posed to sustainable development from the 
projected impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2011b, p. 27). The UNFCCC incorporated this 
recommendation in the form of insurance for vulnerable countries, stating: 
 
[…] the Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the 
 
Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of 
technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties 
arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the 
implementation of response measures […] (UNFCCC, 1992, article 4, para 8) 
 
Despite this early “consideration,” the COP did not take actions to consider loss and damage 
until the Cancun Agreements in 2010. As part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the COP 
formally recognized “[…] the need to strengthen international cooperation and expertise in order 
to understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate 
change, including impacts related to extreme weather and slow onset events” (UNFCCC, 2011a). 
The Loss and Damage work programme thus became and continues to be a part of the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework. 
 
The first action to address loss and damage after Cancun, was to collect and synthesize 
 
Parties’ and select observers’ desires for the elements to include within the loss and damage work 
program. Opinions varied widely with some countries advocating for very specific actions while 
others focused on the structure and implementation of the work programme. For example, 
 
Ethiopia suggested that “[s]ettlements in areas prone to flooding or landslides should be relocated 
 
to safer settings” as well as specific recommendations related to biodiversity conservation, 
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gender equality, disaster recovery, and numerous other concepts (UNFCCC, 2011b, p. 24). Yet 
the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) focused on the structure and lifespan of the work 
programme as well as three key thematic areas: current knowledge on exposure to loss and 
damage, experience with various instruments to address loss and damage, and possible 
implementation pathways under the Convention (UNFCCC, 2011b). Following this initial survey, 
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) drafted conclusions regarding the activities for the 
loss and damage work programme. One of these conclusions was to implement three key 
thematic areas which strongly resemble those suggested by the SIDS: 1) assessing the risk of 
loss and damage, 2) approaches to address loss and damage, and 3) the role of the Convention 
in enhancing the implementation of these approaches (UNFCCC, 2011c). 
 
Soon after developing the initial work programme, the UNFCCC established the Warsaw 
International Mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts (WIM). 
The decision to create the WIM came as a result of COP 18 in Doha. At this conference, the 
Parties agreed on several approaches to address loss and damage, including enhancing support, 
knowledge, and action in various capacities. At Doha, the COP specifically decided to establish 
an international mechanism at the following COP (UNFCCC, 2013a). As Khan (2013) states, “the 
inclusion of an ‘international mechanism’ in the Doha Decision on loss and damage marks an 
important window of opportunity for the further development of such mechanisms” (p. 846). As 
agreed, the following COP in Warsaw led to the official institution of the WIM and its Executive 
Committee (UNFCCC, 2014, dec 2). 
 
Soon after its official instatement, the WIM established its initial two year work plan 
(UNFCCC, 2014a). The plan, which will be the primary focus of the Executive Committee of the WIM 
until 2016, includes 9 action areas. In brief, these action areas focus on 1) enhancing the 
understanding of loss and damage impacts, 2) enhancing risk management approaches, 3) 
enhancing knowledge of risks of and approaches to slow onset events, 4) enhancing knowledge of 
non-economic losses, 5) enhancing understanding of capacity and coordination needs to 
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address loss and damage, 6) enhancing knowledge of migration, displacement, and human 
mobility, 7) encourage risk management using financial instruments, 8) complement the existing 
work of the UNFCCC and other relevant institutions, 9) and develop a five-year rolling workplan. 
While the action areas comprehensively address the primary concerns of the Parties, the exact 
actions the WIM will take remain vague and undetermined. For example, the action area to 
address human mobility only invites stakeholders to collaborate for the creation and collection 
of relevant information with follow-up actions to be determined in 2016. The WIM has taken 
clear steps to address a variety of concerns but its future actions are uncertain. 
 
Many aspects of the WIM remain unclear, including its relationship to adaptation. 
Currently, all UNFCCC loss and damage efforts, including the WIM, remain under the adaptation 
umbrella. On one hand, loss and damage efforts include significant overlap with adaptation. For 
example, action area 2 aims to reduce risk in order to avoid loss and damage and encourage 
 
“long-term resilience of countries” (UNFCCC, 2014a). Many of the loss and damage work 
programme’s proposed actions to reduce risk-- dating back to the initial Party survey for the loss 
(UNFCCC, 2011b)-- include adaptation measures. Adaptation is important to loss and damage in 
a preventative sense. The overlap between the WIM’s workplan and other efforts within the 
Cancun Adaptation Framework may ultimately encourage synergistic efforts to “enhance 
adaptive capacity” (UNFCCC, 2011c) in vulnerable countries. 
 
Yet, loss and damage is not synonymous with adaptation. As McGray et al. (2007) 
describe, “[a]daptation is a process not an outcome” (p. 7) which aims to prevent negative 
impacts from climate change. Whereas, the WIM acknowledges “that loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change includes, and in some cases involves 
more than that which can be reduced by adaptation,” (UNFCCC, 2014b). Loss and damage, as 
described earlier, are the negative outcomes of climate change which adaptation aspires to 
prevent or at least reduce. Methods to reduce climate change impacts in the context of 
 
 
35 
 
adaptation require different strategies than methods to resolve the impacts which occur 
despite the best adaptation efforts. 
 
An important example of how adaptation deviates from loss and damage within the WIM is the 
inclusion of non-economic losses. While adaptation may serve to reduce loss and damage, the Parties 
now recognize that some losses are unavoidable and non-substitutable, meaning that nothing can 
sufficiently replace what a country or community might lose. Non-economic losses clearly demonstrate 
this predicament as no amount of money or resources can adequately replace losses such as life, 
cultural heritage, or territory. While adaptation may minimize or reduce the risk of extensive loss and 
damage, adaptation itself may accrue perceivably lesser forms of loss, often in a non-economic form. 
For example, Fulani pastoralists may adapt to loss of livelihood from climate change by migrating in 
search of work. Yet, this adaptation strategy, incurs a loss of human dignity and self-determination—a 
human right (UN, 1948). Likewise, victims of sea-level rise may avoid loss of life by adapting via 
migration but may still suffer severe loss. 
 
One Marshall islander equated loss of land to “a violent death” since land provides “a reason for 
living” (Barker, 2013, p. 61). For the Marshallese, the value of land cannot be calculated; “[h]ow 
do you put a value on something that people consider as a living thing that is part of your soul?” 
 
(Barker, 2013, p. 61). The recognition of incalculable loss, in some sense separates loss and 
damage from adaptation. Adaptation aims to reduce loss and damage, but the WIM, while 
acknowledging adaptation as an important method, recognizes that adaptation does not capture 
the full essence of the UNFCCC’s role to address irreparable damage. 
 
The distinct nature of loss and damage, along with the growing need to take action to combat 
climate change, calls into question the status of loss and damage within the UNFCCC. Loss and 
damage may evolve into a third pillar, complementing mitigation and adaptation. As Schafer and Kreft 
(2014) point out, “operationalizing the continuum of mitigation- adaptation and loss and damage, might 
require a reconsideration of the status of loss and damage” (p.19) similar to the way in which 
adaptation became a distinct focus within the UNFCCC. Separating loss and 
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damage from adaptation may also encourage action and recognition of the impacts of climate 
change. As Khan (2013) argues, “[a]n appropriate conceptualization of loss and damage associated 
with climate change will provide the necessary guidance for identifying the entities responsible for 
such change, including the private sector” (p. 847). Identifying the guilty parties, so to speak, may 
further boost support for efforts throughout the UNFCCC. The Climate and Development Knowledge 
Network (CDKN, 2012) recalls that “any approach to loss and damage 
 
– particularly at the international level – must seek to increase international commitment to mitigation 
and adaptation, the parameters that influence the extent of residual loss and damage.” 
 
Promoting synergy to prevent climate change from reaching unmanageable levels will ultimately 
serve to benefit all. Making Loss and Damage a stand-alone item may promote such efforts. 
 
However, not all agree that the WIM should become its own entity. Briner et al. (2014) 
suggest that “thorny issues” like the WIM, which Parties find difficult to resolve, “may have been 
outsourced to new bodies” (p. 7) in order to allow individual entities to narrower their resolutions. 
Outsourcing difficult issues, rather than incorporating them into more easily agreed upon or 
already established goals, may serve to postpone or limit any future policy actions regarding such 
issues. For example, creating a separate focus area for adaptation may have divided efforts 
within mitigation and stifled the long-term goals for both. Adger et al. (2006) note the potential for 
competition between goals, arguing that Parties may find adaptation strategies to be cheaper 
than mitigation, ultimately detracting from the most effective strategies to prevent climate change 
as well as loss and damage. Strategies to address any one challenge regarding climate change 
must support the overall goals of the UNFCCC. Briner et al., (2014) further argue that entities 
within the UNFCCC like the Cancun Adaptation Framework are relatively young and need time to 
mature before Parties can accurately assess their outcomes. Further separating the WIM from 
adaptation may simply prevent the Cancun Adaptation Framework from improving its 
arrangements over time. 
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Liability and compensation contribute to Loss and Damage’s “thorny” nature.  The 
 
UNFCCC already acknowledges that developed countries produce the majority of climate 
change-inducing emissions. However, “staunch disagreements between countries and lobbying 
blocks” pervade loss and damage negotiations, primarily due to issues of causality and 
compensation (McNamara, 2014, p. 242). Proving a causal relationship between anthropogenic 
climate change and specific losses and damages remains difficult. Parker et al. (2015) argue that 
scientists can indicate a relationship between slow onset disasters and the frequency of extreme 
weather events but it is “almost impossible to say that an extreme event would not have 
happened without anthropogenic climate change” (p. 270). Yet, discussions about liability and 
compensation have endured since the beginning of the UNFCCC. As mentioned above, island 
nations and other vulnerable countries have pushed for an insurance mechanism to assist 
developing countries in coping with loss and damage. Currently, the WIM’s workplan includes 
insurance and other compensation tools within action area 7, which aims to 
 
Encourage comprehensive risk management by the diffusion of information related to 
financial instruments and tools that address the risks of loss and damage associated 
with the adverse effects of climate change to facilitate finance in loss and damage 
situations in accordance with the policies of each developing country and region, taking 
into account the necessary national efforts to establish enabling environments. These 
financial instruments and tools may include: comprehensive risk management capacity 
with risk pooling and transfer; catastrophe risk insurance; contingency finance; climate-
themed bonds and their certification; catastrophe bonds; and financing approaches to 
making development climate resilient, among other innovative financial instruments and 
tools (UNFCCC, 2014a) 
 
While the WIM recognizes liability and compensation in the form of financial tools, only time 
will reveal how this controversial element of loss and damage comes to fruition, if at all. 
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Although liability remains controversial, it could potentially serve to limit climate change 
impacts, leading to optimal outcomes. Doelle (2014) argues that liability “can create an incentive 
to undertake cost effective mitigation” (p. 38). Parties who fail to meet mitigation goals would 
finance adaptation measures or repair damages, thus creating a financial incentive to improve 
mitigation efforts. ActionAid et al. (2012) reiterate this perspective arguing that the “precautionary 
principle” could be roused by a mechanism which addresses “rehabilitation and compensation” 
 
(p. 3). While this argument recognizes the need for each element of the UNFCCC to reinforce 
the primary goals of the UNFCCC, encouraging wealthier nations to comply may prove very 
difficult. 
 
While liability and compensation are important concerns for vulnerable countries, the 
WIM promises to accomplish much more. Liability tends to take center-stage in loss and damage 
discussions but some negotiators caution against this tunnel vision. Hoffmaister et al. (2014) 
argue that “[w]hile liability and compensation form important elements of the loss and damage 
discussions, this perspective often trivializes the complexity of the issues and inaccurately 
reduces the issue to one of merely determining liability and seeking compensation” (para 3). As 
the WIM’s workplan illustrates, only one of nine action areas pertains to liability and 
compensation. The WIM serves many other important goals such as knowledge creation and 
recognition of the devastating impacts of climate change. 
 
Addressing human migration due to climate change impacts remains another important goal 
of the WIM. The WIM provides a new opportunity to address migration while focusing attention on 
climate change as a driver of migration. The WIM’s current plan of action to address migration is to 
“Enhance the understanding of and expertise on how the impacts of climate change are affecting 
patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility; and the application of such understanding 
and expertise” (UNFCCC, 2014a). This is an important first step, but exactly who and how the WIM 
will help is still vague. Assuming that the WIM eventually takes direct action to support environmental 
migrants, to what extent WIM efforts will focus on impacts 
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directly related to climate change remains uncertain. Proving that a particular group or population 
migrates due to climate change may be similarly difficult to identifying a clear causal relationship 
between anthropogenic climate change and individual, extreme weather events (Parker et al., 
2015). While climate change may increase migration, other factors like economic opportunity may 
also influence a person’s decision to migrate (Bates, 2002). How or if the WIM will address 
migrants with a tenuous causal link to climate change will be important for determining future 
solutions for environmental migration and the WIM’s contribution to the work of other migration-
focused institutions such as the IOM and Nansen Initiative. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
 
 
Climate change further complicates discussions of environmental migration due to our 
ability to anticipate changes. Scientists can predict with some certainty that climate change will 
continue to diminish local environments and cause migration. This creates space to discuss best 
practices for long term solutions. These solutions include a variety of adaptation measures which 
best enhance local conditions and human well-being. Non-climate change related impacts 
usually result in reactive measures and require emergency aid. We can only predict major 
earthquakes and industrial accidents with limited foresight, if at all. Thus, climate change alters 
discussions of future solutions by allowing scholars to consider best practices which minimize 
loss to the greatest extent possible. 
 
Our ability to place blame on humans for climate change further complicates how 
scholars determine responsibility for climate change related impacts. This anthropogenic nature 
of climate change, coupled with our ability to anticipate future changes led to the creation of the 
UNFCCC. With the inception of the UNFCCC came an obligation to collectively mitigate, adapt, 
and respond to climate change impacts. Now that research can link future migration to climate 
change impacts, states therefore have an obligation to address the negative impacts which 
climate change-induced migration causes. Such negative impacts include a sense of loss. 
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While much of the UNFCCC’s focus has been to mitigate GHG emissions, in 2013 the 
 
UNFCCC formally recognized a growing need to systematically address loss and damage to 
climate change impacts; thus, the WIM was born. The WIM is in its infancy, with only a vague 
action plan to guide future strategies for addressing loss and damage. This developing 
mechanism provides space to consider new solutions for addressing environmental migration 
in the context of climate change. It further opens discussions for normative aspects of 
sustainability. The development of the WIM provides an opportunity for states to consider how 
and why they might collectively approach, and perhaps prevent loss. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Perspectives on the Development and Meaning of the WIM 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
At its current stage of development, the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and 
damage associated with climate change impacts (WIM) offers a unique opportunity to answer the 
question: how might this particular organization meet the needs of those who migrate due to 
climate change impacts? As discussed in the previous chapter, migration is one of the possible 
sub-components of the WIM and is currently on their agenda, but it is unclear. Currently, experts 
involved with the WIM and/or loss and damage are grappling with difficult questions such as how 
to create an effective mechanism which will contribute to meeting migrants’ needs. This chapter 
aims to identify 1) how experts understand the role of the WIM in meeting migrants’ needs and 2) 
how experts prioritize loss and damage. Experts provide useful insight into understanding what 
potential the WIM holds for assisting the needs of migrants in some way. 
 
4.2 Interview Methods 
 
 
 
Due to the WIM’s nascent nature, limited information exists which identifies how the WIM can 
or will develop as a mechanism and what impact this might have on human mobility. For this research, 
I chose to interview experts in the field of loss and damage and climate change migration. I define 
experts as individuals who have published on loss and damage and/or participate in the UNFCCC 
negotiation processes. Experts provide insight about the WIM’s development and its contribution to 
climate change migration in a way that surpasses the limited amount of published data available. 
Furthermore, experts play an integral role in the development of the mechanism itself. Experts can 
include both negotiators and observers—both play a significant role in the negotiations. As stated in 
the Executive Committee to the WIM’s initial 
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meeting’s report, the “observers actively participated in the discussion” and “further consultations with 
observers” assisted in finalizing the initial two-year workplan (UNFCCC, 2014a). One interviewee 
reiterated the role of expert observers, stating the COP’s “approaches are very participatory” (1). 
Expert opinions offer timely insight into how and why the WIM takes its shape. 
 
I interviewed 11 experts using a semi-structured interview protocol (see appendix 3). In 
order to secure these interviews, I identified a list of experts based on publications, affiliations 
with stakeholder organizations, and the members of the Executive committee. All experts whom I 
chose to recruit were familiar with climate change loss and damage, but their perspectives varied. 
Some experts focused on migration while others’ expertise came from fields related to agriculture, 
climate analysis, adaptation, anthropology, and political science. I located active email accounts 
for these experts and send a recruitment email. When necessary I followed up with phone 
messages. In total, I attempted to secure interviews with approximately 68 experts. I was 
unsuccessful in securing interviews with any members of the Executive Committee to the WIM. 
This is partly due to there being significantly more limited pool compared to observers and 
scholarly experts. Thus, this research reflects the opinions of scholarly experts and observers to 
the negotiations. 
 
I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews because, unlike structured interviews or 
surveys, this method allowed me to converse with experts in a way that provides space to discuss 
individual concerns and potentially unexpected ideas during the interview (see Hagerman, 2009). 
 
Questions during these interviews primarily focused on experts’ opinions regarding types of 
loss, what the WIM is or should be, and how migration is or might be included in the further 
development of the WIM. The goal of these interviews was to gain insight into how experts think 
and feel about the WIM and climate change migration, rather than to quantify or statistically 
represent a relationship between existing opinions. Thus, I aimed for depth of ideas rather than 
quantity or a statistically proportional sampling. I also gained consent in order to satisfy IRB 
requirements (see appendix 2). Interviews took place over Skype and lasted approximately 20- 
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40 minutes. Finally, I recorded and transcribed each interview in order to code and identify 
themes present in the interviews. I coded for major topics, including: loss and damage, fairness 
and justice, development, vulnerability, adaptation, environmental migration, international 
relations, and the WIM. I used Atlas.ti to code each of these topics in order to discover 
 
“previously unknown relations and categories” (Kelle, 2007, p. 451). Coding these semi-
structured interviews with a range of experts shed light on the nuances of loss and damage 
as well as the perceptions and concerns related to the development of the WIM. 
 
4.3. Results 
 
 
 
From the 11 interviews, several key ideas emerged. First, experts demonstrated concepts of 
loss and damage. They articulated that people can experience varying degrees of loss and that 
developed countries stand to lose more. Second, experts described how they perceived the role and 
functions of the WIM. Currently, the WIM serves to recognize that states need to discuss loss and 
damage, as well as create new knowledge about loss and damage. The WIM further acts as a forum 
to acknowledge global inequalities. Third, experts articulated concerns relating to the future of the 
WIM. Experts noted that the political negotiations become difficult and that determining liability and 
compensation may further exacerbate such challenges. 
 
4.3.1 Concepts of Loss 
 
 
In order to understand how loss influences climate change migrants, it is important to 
recognize how experts conceptualize types of loss which migrants experience and how 
significant these forms of loss may or may not be. Throughout the interviews, experts noted that 
while, difficult to compare, not all forms of loss are equal. Also, climate change may affect 
different groups of people in different ways, which relates to their level of vulnerability. 
 
Experts may have individual ideas about what types of loss are worse than others, but 
they also recognized that different forms of loss are inherently difficult to compare. One strategy 
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to compare loss and damage is to quantify value. As one respondent observed, “a lot of the 
journal articles that are coming out of loss and damage are now trying to account for […] the 
monetary terms of compensation” (4). However, experts argued that loss should not be 
calculated and quantified. One person, in reference to non-economic losses, claimed that “not 
only can they not be monetized, they should not be monetized” (8). While calculating a market 
value for loss and damage might make substitution and comparison easier to decipher, 
experts felt that some types of loss should not be considered exchangeable. 
 
Yet, some losses and damages will likely continue to occur and the WIM may reach a 
point where it formally prioritizes certain forms of loss over others. This poses a serious 
challenge for actors who influence the WIM as well as people at large. Negotiators must 
somehow figure out what to do “about these things that can't be exchanged” (2). As one expert 
explained, “there's a very strong normative element in how […] you define what is a bottom line 
unacceptable loss. And I would say that is […] something that we as a humanity have to agree 
on” (8). In order to prevent the most profound forms of loss, states may have to prioritize certain 
forms of action over others, although what these actions may be remains vague. 
 
Interviewees generally hesitated to compare the value of non-economic losses yet, 
experts still tried to characterize the most profound forms of loss. For example, one expert 
distinguished a hierarchy of loss stating that “you can't think about easy ways of readjusting your 
life without experiencing loss. Obviously there's going to be some cost to moving and all that, but 
it's not going to be catastrophic” (1). Another expert characterized devastating loss, claiming that 
when “the state no longer can protect you […] that becomes truly catastrophic” (4). The 
interviewee further described that when migrants “lose their ability to be a people and they are 
physically displaced […] it's the worst possible thing that could happen to any person” (4). While 
comparing loss in general may be difficult, experts still hold some ideas about what should or 
should not be prioritized in the negotiations. 
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One reason why comparing types of loss may be so difficult is that the feelings or 
physical items which contribute to a person’s culture and identity may not translate consistently 
across cultures. For example, identity for the Marshallese may be most strongly connected to 
land, while the Fulani may consider their traditional livelihood to be most indicative. Barker (2013) 
quotes one Marshallese islander expressing that land provides “a reason for living” (p. 61). 
 
Conversely, Warner et al. (Warner et al., 2013) point out that for Fulani “pastoralism is much 
more than just a source of food or income: it is a way of life” (p. 41). One interviewee supported 
this concept by stating that “in the Sahel region people will say ‘we prefer to have water for our 
livestock than for ourselves’” (6). In order to meet migrants’ needs, the WIM and other 
organizations may need to be cognizant of different cultural values and how unacceptable loss 
takes form. It is important to recognize that experts conceptualize certain form of loss to be 
worse than others as these concepts may translate into how the WIM or other organizations may 
ultimately address migrants’ needs. 
 
While determining which needs are most important to a particular community is difficult, it 
is also difficult to determine which communities around the world are most deserving. One expert 
claimed that “if people are displaced for climate related reasons I don't feel like I can say one 
deserves more support than the other” (1). Yet experts ultimately alluded to two factors which 
contribute to identifying whom the WIM should prioritize: capability and responsibility. 
 
First, experts identified vulnerable communities who lack the capacity to help 
themselves. One expert characterized “the least developed countries where people's livelihoods 
are more sensitive to perturbations” (1) as those who should be the WIM’s primary focus. Another 
expanded on the concept of developing countries, explaining that these countries are vulnerable 
in two ways, “one is just geographical reasons and the other is that they don't have the capacity” 
 
(4). Geography plays a role because many of the least developed countries stand to experience 
the most severe climate impacts. Yet, a community’s capacity to cope with climate impacts can 
compound the severity of extreme events like heat waves or floods. As one expert stated, “the 
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definition of an extreme event almost changes depending on how much people are able to 
cope with events” (7). Another expert described capacity in relation to economic means: “in 
poorer communities where people do not have resources to invest in adaptation, the loss and 
the damage will be higher” (10). Capacity and vulnerability played a significant role in how 
experts conceived the impacts of loss and damage, and ultimately whom the WIM should help 
within a generalized context. 
 
Experts further noted discrepancies between vulnerable countries’ contributions to 
climate change and the extent to which they will feel its impacts. One expert claimed that “there is 
a disproportionate amount of benefits and harms that are distributed around the world as a result 
of climate change and so those who seem to benefit the most from climate change not from 
climate change per se but from generations of emissions have been the rich countries of the 
world” (4). In the context of negotiations, another expert explained “the poor and vulnerable 
voices don't get heard” (8). Assistance for these disproportionally effected people should thus, 
 
“provide some kind of, if not reparation, some kind of restoration” (4). Experts seemed to 
conceptually prioritize the most vulnerable countries with the least amount of agency within 
the negotiations as those for whom the WIM should prioritize. 
 
While many experts hesitated to directly state priorities for whom and how the WIM might 
support people, they eventually noted that some forms of loss are “catastrophic.” They further 
alluded to the disproportionate power dynamic and adaptive capacity between rich and poor 
countries as a motivation to prioritize some countries over others. In general, experts considered 
long term circumstances of broad communities when identifying the role of the WIM in supporting 
those impacted by climate change. This illuminates the ways in which experts make decisions 
when identifying needs associated with climate change impacts. 
 
4.3.2 Purpose and Functions of the WIM 
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In addition to sharing thoughts about how to prioritize communities and types of loss, 
experts expressed ideas related to the current purpose and functions of the WIM and hopes for 
future outcomes. Experts characterized the WIM as a tool to formally recognize that loss and 
damage is a real problem, to assist states and stakeholders in gathering further knowledge about 
loss and damage, and as a way to acknowledge inequity between developed and developing 
states. Experts also shared their hopes for future progress. Such hopes included a range of 
ideas, mostly centered on making funds available for communities and states to cope with future 
loss and damages, as well as further recognition of global inequalities. The WIM is still developing 
and therefore, no one can truly say what the WIM will be or how it will function in the future. 
However, understanding how experts perceive the role of the WIM sheds light on possible ways 
in which the WIM might support future climate change migrants. 
 
First, experts expressed the idea that the WIM currently serves to recognize that loss 
and damage exists and that climate change creates needs. As one expert explained, creating the 
WIM caused the taboo subject of loss and damage-- and in some ways liability and 
compensation-- to become “un-tabooed” (8). Another expert further explained that “what 
developing countries really want is recognition that what has been done so far, in terms of 
mitigation and [adaptation], is not enough” (1). This sentiment shows that the WIM serves in part 
to acknowledge that developing countries are seriously affected by climate change, while also at 
the mercy of wealthier countries to prevent and minimize loss and damage. Formally recognizing 
that needs exist can also catalyze methods to address those needs. Since the WIM is in the very 
beginning stages of development, acknowledging the situation “allows space to discuss things, 
work things out, try to examine them in greater detail” (8). For the WIM, and migration in 
particular, such space is important because “there needs to be some fair way to think about 
 
[migration] so all of these claims about loss and damage in particular necessitate some 
conversation about what is fair, what is the ethical way to deal with this” (3). While experts 
typically spoke about recognizing loss and damage in general, the role of recognition affects 
climate change migrants. Formally recognizing that a problem exists motivates and legitimizes 
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the efforts of different actors to prevent and address loss and damage, including those 
which climate change migrants endure. 
 
The WIM further serves as a forum to spur the development and dispersal of knowledge 
about loss and damage. Knowledge is significant because it adds weight to the legitimacy of loss 
and damage within the broader negotiations. As one expert claimed, “the loss and damage 
discussions under the UNFCCC have the empirical evidence-- scientific evidence on the ground-
- that showed beyond a reasonable doubt that yes, loss and damage does occur” (5). This 
evidence contributed to the UNFCCC formally recognizing the need for a loss and damage 
mechanism. While knowledge contributed to the creation of the WIM, it also contributes to the 
ongoing development of the WIM. One expert explained that at various times “some new 
research needs to be brought aboard, assessed, made sense of” in order to assist with creating 
the WIM (8). For example, understanding the direct links of anthropogenic climate change to 
specific losses and damages could assist the WIM in somehow addressing those particular 
needs. To do this, negotiators need to research “what loss and damage actually is” (7). 
 
Creating and spreading knowledge works iteratively with the process of formal recognition. 
Knowledge, in the form of research, helps stimulate formal recognition, which in turn requires 
additional knowledge over time. Both assist the WIM in achieving its goals-- however vague 
those goals may be at this point in time. 
 
In specific regard to climate change migrants, experts further suggested that migrants need 
some form of direct support. For example, one expert mentioned the need for post-migration support, 
saying that “people are forced to flee and need to be resettled or organized some way” (4). Another 
expert also raised the need for international organizations to support migrants by “providing jobs, 
providing people immigration status, providing people […] skills and benefits and jobs and those kinds 
of things” (3). Again, providing direct support works iteratively with knowledge. As one expert stated, 
“you will never know loss and damage if you do not know the grassroots level” (6). By this, the expert 
argued that an organization cannot meet the needs of 
 
a community if it does not understand what those needs are. Yet, the WIM is not at a state to 
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provide such support and perhaps never will be. One expert stated, “I don’t see the WIM taking 
any role like the UNHCR; other organizations can focus on providing that” (11). While direct 
support for migrants may lie outside the scope of the WIM, experts alluded to such needs for 
migrants. 
 
Experts further characterized the purpose of the WIM to be a tool for global equity. While 
the capabilities of the WIM remain unclear, the WIM currently marks a need to discuss the 
inequality throughout the world. These inequalities relate to climate change in the sense that 
 
“people are highly impacted, yet those that are impacted are the least responsible for those 
emissions” (5). One expert remarked that such global inequalities existed before climate change 
but, “there should be a greater redistribution of wealth across the planet anyway. If [the WIM] is 
the way it has to happen, so be it” (2). The WIM, thus, provides a forum for discussing global 
inequalities, in order to “work through these issues of responsibility” (11). 
 
Experts further shared some ideas for how the types of outcomes which could support 
fairness and equality amongst countries. These include: crop insurance (5), a legal framework for 
attributing liability (3,4,11), a catalog of losses for remembrance (2), and some undefined action 
which addresses and prevents future losses (1,6,7, 8,9). While specific ideas for the future of the 
WIM were typically vague, interviewees perceived the WIM as a tool to consider needs of the 
most vulnerable populations. 
 
Ultimately, experts identified two current functions of the WIM: Formally recognizing 
that loss and damage exists and promoting knowledge about loss and damage. In specific 
regard to migrants, experts suggested that migrants need additional forms of direct support, 
although the WIM may never act in this way. Experts further suggested that the WIM served as 
a tool to address to global inequalities. 
 
4.3.3 Concerns for the WIM 
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In order for the WIM to meet the needs of future migrants, policy-makers and other 
stakeholders must first recognize the challenges which may prevent future progress of the 
mechanism. Experts voiced a number of concerns regarding the future role and development 
of the WIM, though not necessarily in regard to migration. Their primary concerns centered on 
struggles within the negotiation process. One key area of concern is the lack of cooperation 
between countries and the political process which takes place as a part of the negotiations. 
Experts often perceived liability and compensation as not only a part of the WIM but also an 
important driver of the political challenges which the WIM must overcome. 
 
Experts perceived the political process associated with negotiating as a significant barrier to 
any meaningful outcomes which the WIM might eventually produce. For example, one expert 
expressed concern that the negotiation processes “are slow and […] decisions are often political 
rather than really focused on people,” (1). Another expert further expressed concern that the 
negotiations would cause the meaning of loss and damage to become “sufficiently diluted” (4). 
 
This idea comes from concern that negotiators might sacrifice significant change for a 
meaningless agreement. Experts further noted that “developed countries are put up against the 
developing countries and that’s not a good way” (1). While developing countries may outnumber 
developed states, “by and large their voices are not heard” (8) within the negotiations. The 
negotiation process may be necessary in some way, but experts felt dissatisfied by the potential 
for the WIM to fall victim to slow processes which may yield mediocre results. 
 
One primary reason for concern regarding the political process of the WIM is due to 
controversy over liability and compensation. Loss and damage is, in some ways difficult to separate 
from liability and compensations. As discussed in Chapter 3, the WIM developed out of discussions 
for compensation such as insurance. While loss and damage has taken on additional meaning-- 
particularly in regards to non-economic losses-- some experts perceive the purpose of the WIM as 
inextricably linked to liability and compensation. In this regard, states have considered the concept of 
loss and damage for decades, but the term loss and damage is a 
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relatively new label within the UNFCCC. As one expert explained, “I think it was only a matter of 
time before there was a name put to the nature of liability” (3). Another expert further articulated 
this sentiment, stating that loss and damage is “the euphemism” (8) used to discuss liability and 
compensation. The concept of liability and compensation, in some sense, stems from the 
underlying question: “who is going to pay” (6) for loss and damage? However, the subject of 
money causes tension between developed and the least developed states, thus causing liability 
and compensation to be an issue of concern. 
 
Experts articulated fears that tension between states regarding liability and compensation 
would prevent the WIM from achieving meaningful progress within the UNFCCC. As one expert 
described, developed states “don't want to hear the word compensation, so I am very pessimistic” 
 
(5).  Another expert explained that the topic of liability and compensation is “very tricky one” (7). 
 
Liability and compensation may be an important tool for the WIM to allocate funds to address 
loss and damage, but experts noted that achieving such agreements will be difficult. 
 
Due to the difficult nature of liability and compensation, some experts argued that the 
 
WIM should avoid the issue completely. One expert explained that “when you start point fingers 
you won't have a good agreement” (6). Also, the nature of liability and compensation may further 
drive countries apart, rather than working toward a common goal for all people. As one expert 
noted, “fighting over which country should pay how much to this community or that community, 
that’s not the way forward” (1). While some experts felt that the WIM should act as a forum to 
pursue liability and compensation, not all shared this sentiment. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
 
 
The experts for this research provided substantial insight into the meaning of loss and 
damage and the role of the WIM. Experts demonstrated that some forms of loss are more 
significant than others, such as loss of state, heritage, identity, and knowledge. They also 
 
expressed ideas that the current role of the WIM is to create knowledge and discussion 
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loss and damage, particularly in developing countries. They further expressed important 
concerns regarding the future success of the WIM in regard to the negotiation process and 
the sensitive nature of liability and compensation. 
 
Throughout each of these discussions, fairness, equity, and justice arose as main 
concerns for experts. These concepts pervaded the ways in which experts formulated their ideas 
about loss and damage as well as the WIM. The WIM therefore highlights not only a need for 
greater equity between countries, but also an opportunity to incorporate values and principles into 
new methods for sustainably managing the impacts of climate change. 
 
In terms of climate change migrants, experts perceived the WIM as a tool to recognize, 
further understand, and in some way cope with the losses which migration incurs. Some experts 
viewed migration as a key concern for the WIM while others acknowledged its significance but 
commented little on the ways in which the WIM might address migration. Such diversity of 
perspectives however, mostly reflects the interviewees own research interests; those who study 
loss from the perspective of migration more frequently referenced migration when describing the 
role and function of the WIM. While no expert denied the significance of migration in regards to 
loss and damage, how migration compares to the WIM’s 8 other action areas remains unclear. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Assessment of international Migration Organizations 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
No robust estimate exists to identify how many people climate change might displace, 
yet experts believe that extreme weather events could cause many people to temporarily or 
permanently migrate (IPCC, 2013). As Kälin (2015) aptly explains, “[s]uch displacement creates 
not only legal protection problems but also operational, institutional and funding challenges, 
since no international organization has a clear mandate for such people” (p. 5). Using data 
collected from expert interviews and literature, I propose a framework for analyzing international 
organizations in order to answer the question: how might international organizations meet the 
needs of climate change migrants? By assessing how institutions may or may not support the 
needs of climate change migrants, I will be able to identify where gaps exist, if any, and potential 
solutions to fulfill future needs. 
 
5.2 Defining Climate Change Migrants and a Common Responsibility 
 
 
 
For this assessment, I focus on potential migrants who directly endure climate change 
impacts. This category of environmental migrants includes 1) those who move temporarily, 
permanently, or seasonally due to climate change impacts, 2) those who may or may not move 
depending on the success of preventative measures (e.g. communities at risk of sea-level rise 
who implement strategies such as sea walls), and 3) those who lack the means to move but 
whose well-being depends on migration (e.g. the most vulnerable who cannot leave a damaged 
area). From here on, I will collectively refer to these people as climate change migrants for the 
purposes of this chapter. 
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Climate change migrants are unique from other environmental migrants due to the 
responsibilities associated with the cause of their migration. I choose to focus on climate change 
migrants because each state, or Party to the UNFCCC, shares a responsibility to support these 
migrants as a result of anthropogenic climate change. As described in Chapter 3, the UNFCCC 
determines the shared responsibilities of states based on two key clauses. First, the UNFCCC 
 
[Notes] that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse 
gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing 
countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in 
developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs (1992) 
 
This statement demonstrates that climate change relates to historic inequalities but is a collective 
challenge. While developed countries must reduce their emissions, developing countries will produce 
more in order to meet their needs. Further, it demonstrates that no state can singularly be blamed for 
climate change, thus making the impacts of climate change a collective burden. 
 
Second, the UNFCCC identifies states’ responsibilities and capabilities by 
 
 
Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible 
cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international 
response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities and their social and economic conditions (1992) 
 
These two clauses illustrate that migration caused by climate change impacts are 1) a 
collective burden which cannot be attributed to individual states and 2) a burden which states 
cannot and perhaps should not address on their own given that states’ hold different 
responsibilities capabilities. 
 
By focusing on potential migrants directly impacted by climate change, I notably exclude 
two categories of environmental migrants. These categories include those who migrate due to 
environmental disasters which are not related to anthropogenic climate change (e.g. earthquakes, 
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volcano eruptions) and those who migrate due to resource extraction and development 
schemes (e.g. oil spills, hydroelectric dams,). I exclude these two subgroups of environmental 
migrants because the responsibilities for burden sharing as outlined by the UNFCCC do not 
apply. For example, countries are not obliged to assist communities who migrate in the wake of 
an earthquake under the same auspices as those who migrate due to climate change disasters. 
These victims may still require international aid but such aid comes from humanitarian concern 
rather than a duty predicated on a state’s contribution to climate change. Additionally, states do 
not necessarily share an ambiguous but collective burden to assist those who migrate due to 
direct outcomes of resource extraction and development. Under such circumstances, we can 
directly identify parties who are responsible for any harm inflicted upon these migrants. For 
instance, the United States held Texaco legally responsible for oil contamination which 
diminished the habitability of the land for indigenous communities in the Amazon (Hancock, 
2003). While all types of environmental migrants may at times require outside assistance, the 
responsibility for supplying such assistance does not remain constant across all causes of 
migration. 
 
However, acknowledging that various forms of environmental migration are connected 
remains important. While the responsibility to assist these migrants may be based on different 
assumptions, international organizations may not use these same assumptions of responsibility 
when determining how to distribute support. For example, the Red Cross is still in Haiti providing 
aid after the devastating 2010 earthquake (Red Cross, n.d.). For the Red Cross engaging in 
emergency support for those affected by an earthquake compared to those affected by a 
hurricane linked to climate change impacts differs in few ways beyond logistics. While this 
chapter does not directly address the needs and strategies to assist these excluded migrants, 
we must acknowledge that at times, all types of migrants require aid from international 
institutions. Many migrants share a pool of resources which thus, further puts pressure on actors 
to prioritize needs amongst climate change migrants. 
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5.3 International Organizations 
 
 
 
For this research, I examine the role of international organizations (IOs) in assisting 
those who migrate due to climate change impacts. IO’s are inherently related to international 
institutions but the two are not synonymous. Martin and Simmons (2013) define international 
organizations as entities with agency and international institutions as rules and norms which 
govern organizations. For example, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) is an international organization which supports refugees, whereas the 
Convention on the Status of Refugees is an institution which governs how the UNHCR provides 
support. IOs play an important role in addressing the needs of environmental migrants when 
countries cannot effectively meet migrants’ needs independently. IOs carry knowledge and 
experience which are uniquely suited to meet the needs of migrants and surpass the respective 
capabilities of developing countries where many environmental migrants originate. 
 
In order to examine how IOs support the needs of potential migrants from climate 
change impacts, I define the objective of IOs in this context as improving and maintaining the 
well-being of environmental migrants to the greatest extent possible. Based on concerns 
identified by the IPCC and the interviews discussed in Chapter 4, IOs must promote 1) health, 2) 
security, and 3) self determination in order to improve and maintain well-being. 
 
 Health: The IPCC (2013) recognizes a variety of factors which diminish the health of 
migrants including disease and trauma. For instance, migrants are susceptible to 
diseases when they move to an area which cannot provide proper healthcare or 
sanitary conditions (IPCC, 2013). Migrants suffer trauma and need mental healthcare 
when they experience loss (IPCC, 2013).

 Security: Institutions must also address human security which includes safe housing and 
livelihoods. The IPCC identifies housing as a concern for those who migrate to urban areas. 
As one expert described, “the new-comers the migrants they end up in the most
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abominable places when you're in vulnerable situation” (1). Also, people often migrate in 
search of improved livelihoods if their resource base is undermined by climate change 
(IPCC, 2013). 
 
 Self-Determination: Lastly, institutions can promote well-being by protecting migrants or 
potential migrants’ abilities to determine and prioritize their own needs. As one 
interviewee stated, “when you make the decision yourself it’s much easier to accept the 
negative consequences but when someone else makes the decision for you or when you 
are forced to it feels much worse” (1). IOs can support self-determination by maintaining 
viable options for climate change migrants rather than imposing limited strategies if other 
options exist. For example, inhabitants of small island states maintain self-determine if 
they can choose whether to move or maintain a habitable environment through 
adaptation. IOs do not support self-determination if they assume one strategy or solution 
is better than another when more than one viable option exists or when individuals prefer 
strategies which do not align with an IO’s strategy. However, IOs face limited resources 
and viable strategies. IOs are not panaceas to climate change and some loss and 
damage will be unavoidable. This research aims to identify the primary methods which 
IOs use to achieve well-being and where any future solutions exist in order to further 
support and improve the work of IOs.
 
These criteria allow one to determine the breadth of direct support which IOs 
collectively need to offer in order to fulfill migrants’ needs. 
 
5.4 Framework for analysis 
 
 
 
Using literature and interviews, I developed a framework to analyze how individual IOs 
support climate change migrants (see Figure 1). IOs support migrants in three primary ways: 
recognizing migrants’ needs, creating and spreading knowledge, and on the ground actions. On 
the ground actions support the health, security, and self-determination of migrants. By 
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understanding and identifying how these methods of support work, this framework illuminates 
specific areas of concern assuming that the needs of climate change migrants will grow in the 
coming decades. 
 
First, IOs must formally recognize that migrants need outside support to protect their well-
being. IOs enact this form of support by creating and reforming organizations or the institutions 
which guide organizations. For example, the United Nations (an IO) recognized the needs of 
displaced peoples after WWII and created the UNHCR (an IO) and the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees (an international institution) which guides how the UNHCR determines whom 
to help (UNHCR, 1967, n.d.-c). Without formally recognizing the needs of migrants, IOs could 
potentially ignore their needs which results in no action or limited action. 
 
Second, IOs support migrants by creating and spreading knowledge about their needs as 
well as strategies to address those needs. IOs achieve this by supporting research and 
publishing reports. IOs may not always conduct their own research; at times they may rely on 
partner organizations to share information. This form of support works iteratively with the first— 
formally recognizing needs. As IOs generate new knowledge they, in turn, refine the organization 
and guiding institutions or develop new ones to better address needs. For instance, the UNHCR 
became aware of growing migration needs in Africa which led to the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (UNHCR, 1967, n.d.-c). Furthermore, recognizing a problem can also 
drive new research. For example, COP 11 in 2005 formally acknowledged a growing need for 
adaptation. To follow this recognition, the COP instituted the Nairobi Work Programme for the 
purposes of “[e]nhanced development, dissemination and use of knowledge from practical 
adaptation activities” (UNFCCC, 2006). As needs become apparent, organizations may realize 
that they need more research to promote best practices. Knowledge ultimately enables IOs to 
effectively address needs and avoid poor judgment. 
 
Third, IOs implement direct support for climate change migrants using three distinct 
 
strategies: A) promoting habitability, B) assisting migration, and C) supporting migrants after 
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displacement. IOs may provide these strategies within the contexts of emergencies or long term 
efforts with lasting effects. IOs may promote each of these strategies independently or as a 
comprehensive, long term strategy for well-being. Over time, migrants may require all three forms 
of assistance. For example, a low-lying community may need assistance to make their home 
livable in the face of sea-level rise in order to avoid migration. IOs may promote adaptation 
strategies, such as sea-walls to protect their home (A). This same community may endure an 
extremely devastating hurricane. In this case, the community may need help from an IO to 
evacuate the area before and after the event (B). Next, the community may need temporary 
housing (C) while an IO again helps the community rebuild damage infrastructure (A). Some 
community members may then require assistance to return home (B), while others may prefer 
help to become established in a new, more secure region (C). Direct support for migrants also 
works iteratively with action 2—creating and disseminating knowledge. As IOs provide direct 
support, researchers can learn new lessons in order to refine specific support strategies. Also, 
new knowledge of policy changes, technologies, or climate change science can lead to better 
methods of direct support. 
 
I distinguish each action and strategy from one another because each can exist 
independently. IOs may choose to focus their efforts on one or multiple support methods. 
Furthermore, by distinguishing each action and strategy we can identify more clearly where gaps 
in support exist, where an IO experiences challenges, and ultimately why an IO may not 
effectively provide support. 
 
5.5 Evaluation of International Organizations 
 
 
 
In order to understand how IOs might meet the needs of future climate change 
migrants, we must first understand what types of actions they already take in order to meet the 
existing needs of migrants. Evaluating how IO’s already support migrants and protect their well-
being may further shed light on where any potential gaps in services might exist. 
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Hundreds of international organizations exist. Evaluating each one lies beyond the scope 
of this research. Thus, I have chosen to discuss 3 representative organizations. I will discuss the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Nansen Initiative, and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). These three organizations represent the breadth of 
institutional arrangements which organizations may be used to support migrants. First, the 
UNHCR demonstrates a legal institution for protecting migrants—specifically refugees. The 
Nansen Initiative demonstrates an organization which specifically aims to fulfill the needs of 
climate change migrants which are not protected by legal frameworks like the UNHCR. The 
Nansen Initiative is an optional forum for states to discuss non-binding agreements as an 
alternative method for meeting migrants’ needs. Lastly, The IOM represents another international 
framework for migrants which functions without specific legal obligations as compared to the 
UNHCR. The IOM is the most comprehensive organization in terms of types of support provided 
to migrants. Furthermore, these organizations are each managed by a collection of states rather 
than by private organizations. I chose to focus on state-led organizations because climate change 
obligates states to act. While private organizations may contribute significant support for 
migrants, states collectively must also fulfill these needs. Below are brief overviews of each 
organization which are then followed by a framework analysis of the specific types of actions 
each organization promotes. 
 
5.5.1 The United Nations office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter two, The UNHCR does not actually support climate change 
migrants but still represents the perceived gold standard of migration support. As one interviewee 
states, “think about how the world would be without it” (3). The UNHCR does not support climate 
change migrants because it does not formally recognize their needs within the scope of the 
organization. Its guiding convention focuses on those who "owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing 
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to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" (UNHCR, 1967). Thus, 
climate change migrants do not meet the qualifications for assistance under the Refugee 
Convention. 
 
The supposed success of the UNHCR is often attributed to the Refugee Convention 
having “a much more obligatory sort of law” (3). Yet the actual obligations of states to actively 
accept refugees into their territories are tenuous. The refugee Convention does not oblige states 
to allow refugees into their country, rather it prohibits states from expelling refugees by outlining 
that “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened […]” (UNHCR, 1967, 
article 33). While the Refugee Convention may support some refugees in building a better life, 
the lack of support somewhat tarnishes its success. 
 
Despite the UNHCR, many refugees around the world do not receive sufficient support. As 
Loescher (2008) points out, “over two-thirds of the world's refugees are trapped in protracted 
refugee situations, struggling to survive in remote and insecure parts of the world.” One explanation 
for this, may be due to a “shrinking humanitarian space” (Gatrell, 2013, p. 280). Collinson and 
Elhawary (2012) propose one definition of shrinking humanitarian space to be the 
 
“humanitarian space delineating the agency’s ability to operate freely and meet the humanitarian 
needs in accordance with the principles of humanitarian action” (p. 1). Such shrinkage could 
reflect the current refugee crisis in the European Union where over 110,000 asylum seekers 
have applied in Hungary alone (IOM, 2015c). This rapidly growing humanitarian need has 
caused states within the European Union to restrict migration flows and to negotiate how many 
migrants each state will take (BBC, 2015c). The UNHCR may attempt to support refugees but is, 
at least for now, failing to meet growing needs of a narrow scope of “worthy” migrants. 
 
Such inability to address an overwhelming need should, from a humanitarian perspective, 
cause member states to improve and increase the efforts of an organization like the UNHCR so 
 
that the organization functions appropriately. However, in practice excessive need may be one 
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reason for the UNHCR to maintain a strict definition of whom the Refugee Convention 
formally recognizes as refugees. 
 
5.5.2 Nansen Initiative 
 
 
The Nansen Initiative, established in 2012, is a relatively new response to meeting the 
needs of climate change migrants. The Initiative itself developed after the Nansen Conference in 
 
2011 where the Norwegian Government drafted the Nansen Principles “to guide responses to 
some of the urgent and complex challenges raised by displacement in the context of climate 
change and other environmental hazards” (The Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, p. 5). The 
intent of drafting the ten principles was to formally recognize that environmental migrants 
around the world need attention from state actors. The Nansen Initiative is thus an organization 
which relies on a set of non-legal documents as its guiding manifesto. 
 
The Nansen Initiative specifically aims to support migrants whom other agencies 
generally exclude by creating a forum for interested states to collaborate. As the Initiative 
declares, “a serious legal gap exists with regard to cross-border movements in the context of 
disasters and the effects of climate change” (Nansen Initiative, n.d.). It specifically targets those 
migrants who do not qualify for refugee status and who cannot rely their own state for protection. 
In order to meet the unique needs of these migrants, the Norwegian Government formed the 
Nansen Initiative so that interested states could work together to find meaningful ways to 
address concerns (Kälin, 2012). The Initiative’s “bottom-up process” starts with sub-regional 
consultation, which leads to a consolidated knowledge base, then global dialogue, then a 
protection agenda, and finally dissemination and follow-up (Nansen Initiative, n.d.). Essentially, 
the Initiative aims to understand regional needs and then create a knowledge base from which to 
develop best practices for cross-border environmental migrants. 
 
The Initiative is currently working to finalize its protection agenda. The timeframe for 
completing the Initiative’s action plan was 2012-2015, with the hope of creating a subsequent 
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action plan (Kälin, 2015). Currently, information regarding the Initiative’s protection agenda remains 
vague. While one of the agenda’s stated elements is “operational responses,” (Nansen Initiative, n.d.) 
the Nansen Initiative provides no clear strategies to indicate what those responses include or how 
states will implement them. Gemenne and Brucker (2015) note that “[t]he notion of protection itself 
must be clarified, in order to avoid a policy that would be neither rights-based nor needs-based, and 
that might result in difficult application in the field” (p. 260). The Nansen 
 
Initiative holds great potential to support migrants directly but currently, its strategies 
and outcomes are mere speculation. 
 
While still a young organization, the Nansen Initiative has successfully supported climate 
change migrants, in regard to its stated purpose, by creating a forum for states to formally 
recognize and create knowledge about migrants’ needs. Its success thus far may be attributed to 
the collaborative support system which does not formally commit any individual state to specific 
policies. As Gemenne and Brucker (2015) argue, “[t]his cooperative approach is a crucial 
condition for the success of any policy initiative in the field of environmental migration” (p. 260). 
 
One reason for this cooperation may be due to the Initiative existing as an optional forum in which 
states choose to participate. While the Initiative as a whole may share knowledge with various other 
organizations like the IOM, it lies outside of the UN system. States thus seek out the Initiative as an 
opportunity to share and discuss the challenges they face in supporting migrants. Further, the Initiative 
does not legally bind states to any actions. Rather, it develops knowledge for states which may 
ultimately do nothing more than help states determine how best to achieve already existing 
commitments like human rights. As Cohen argues, states will more likely utilize recommendations for 
best practices if “they are not asked to assume new obligations, but rather to understand better how to 
apply their existing obligations in new circumstances” (Cohen, 2013, p. 13). The future of the Nansen 
Initiative remains unclear at this point. Nevertheless, it “appears today as one of the most promising 
initiatives to address environmental migration” (Gemenne & Brücker, 2015, p. 263). The Initiative’s 
primary successes thus far have been to provide a forum 
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for states to recognize the needs of climate change migrants as outlined in the Nansen 
Principles and create knowledge about how to best help migrants. 
 
5.5.3 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
 
 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is arguably the most comprehensive 
international organization which recognizes, creates knowledge, and provides direct support to all 
categories of migrants. As discussed in Chapter two, the IOM is an organization within the UN. The 
UN established the IOM in 1951 in the wake of WWII in order to manage European migration flows. 
Unlike many humanitarian aid organizations which are non-governmental, the IOM is an international 
governing body. Currently 157 member states comprise the IOM’s Council, which “is the highest 
authority and determines IOM policies” (IOM, n.d.-b). The IOM functions similarly to the UNHCR but 
with a broader list of strategies which supports many different migrants. 
 
The IOM formally recognizes a variety of migration-related needs as identified by its 
constitution. Yet the constitution and the IOM’s current work seem to lack transparent decision-
making at times. For instance, the constitution makes few statements regarding who actually 
qualifies as a migrant. It simply states broad categories such as “refugees, displaced persons, 
and other individuals in need of international migration services” (IOM, 1953). The constitution 
does however note that developing countries deserve recognition, stating “that in the cooperation 
and other international activities for migration the needs of developing countries should be taken 
into account” (IOM, 1953). While the constitution makes no specific claims about how to prioritize 
needs, it does emphasize the economic contributions and needs of migrants by recognizing 
 
that migration may stimulate the creation of new economic opportunities in receiving 
countries and that a relationship exists between migration and the economic, social and 
cultural conditions in developing countries (IOM, 1953) 
 
This suggests that the actors who drafted the constitution acknowledged that migration 
 
assistance benefits both the State as well as to the long term livelihood needs of migrants. The 
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benefits of migration for a states may encourage Member States to support the IOM’s goals, but 
it raises questions about the priority of humanitarian principles which underscore the IOM’s 
service to migrants in need. Ashutosh and Mountz (2011) particularly criticize the IOM for its 
ambiguous allegiance to migrants, claiming that “the IOM represents a novel form of neoliberal 
governance and is indicative of the transformations of sovereignty that extend beyond capital 
flows to include the management of migrant bodies” (p. 22). While the IOM may formally 
recognize that migrants require international assistance, it may ultimately succumb to the 
priorities of its most powerful member states. 
 
The IOM aims to serve migrants in general, which ultimately includes climate change 
migrants. One of the IOM’s strengths in supporting climate change migrants, as well as all 
migrants, is its efforts to create and spread knowledge. This support strategy is a key activity 
listed in the Constitution, which states that the IOM should 
 
provide a forum to States as well as international and other organizations for the 
exchange of views and experiences, and the promotion of cooperation and 
coordination of efforts on international migration issues, including studies on such 
issues in order to develop practical solutions. (IOM, 1953) 
 
In terms of climate change migration, the IOM began working with the UNFCCC in 2006 in 
order to bring evidence and knowledge about climate change migration to the climate 
negotiations (IOM, 2015b). 
 
The IOM further supports climate change migrants through direct strategies. The IOM 
identifies states as holding the primary responsibility to meet climate change migrants’ needs 
 
(IOM, 2010). The organization typically supports states by “strengthening the capacity of state 
authorities and institutions to respond” to climate disasters but will also provide humanitarian aid 
when a state in unable to fulfill extensive needs (IOM, 2010). The IOM actualizes humanitarian aid 
using all three strategies to directly support climate change migrants: promote habitability, 
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migration assistance, and post-displacement support. For example, the IOM promotes habitability 
in the Marshall Islands by supplying the islanders with desalinization and rain harvesting 
equipment (IOM, 2013c). While initially an emergency response to drought, the equipment will 
help ensure a long term supply of clean water as islanders face sea level rise and other extreme 
weather events. Furthermore, the IOM supports assisted migration as an emergency response. 
Before Hurricane Sandy in Haiti in 2013, the IOM helped facilitate evacuations of vulnerable 
people (IOM, 2013b). The IOM further supports migrants through emergency post-displacement 
efforts. For example, after Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in 2013, the IOM set up emergency 
camps and distributed essential supplies for those displaced in camps (IOM, 2013d). While the 
IOM supports a variety of on the ground support measures, most tend to be an emergency 
response rather than long-term solutions for climate change migrants. The reason for which may 
simply be that emergency situations, like extreme weather events, tend to be the most 
overwhelming for individual states and thus, necessitates help from the IOM. 
 
The IOM may not be perfect or completely transparent about its decision-making 
processes but it provides a network of support for states and migrants by sharing knowledge, 
contributing evidence of climate change migration to the UNFCCC, and providing on the 
ground support. What remains unclear for future climate change migrants is the IOM’s role in 
providing direct long term support. While the IOM endorses migration as a climate change 
adaptation strategy (IOM, 2010), only time will tell how the IOM will, if at all, meet a growing 
need for support. 
 
5.5.4 Assessment of Recognition 
 
 
Table 1 Rating Legend 
 
Capacity to manage need Denoted by 
  
Satisfies need ** 
  
Attempts to satisfy need * 
  
Does not address need -- 
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 “satisfies need” is determined by current and legitimate examples of actions which 
the organization achieves
 “Attempts to satisfy need” is determined by needs which the organization claims to 
do, but clear examples are tenuous, or scholars note significant failures for this effort.
 “Does not address need” is determined by no claims by the organization to address need
 
Table 2 Action for Support-- Recognition of Climate Change Migrants 
 
Organization Rating Explanation (institutional commitment, development, and 
  reform) 
   
UNHCR -- Convention for Refugees only 
   
Nansen Initiative ** Developed specifically to address regional and global policy 
  strategies for  cross-border climate change migrants 
   
IOM ** Constitution to address needs of all migrants including 
  refugees, displaced persons, and other individuals in need of 
  services 
   
WIM * Recognizes climate change migration in the context of loss 
  and damage from climate change impacts only 
   
Assessment of ** Recognition of needs is collectively met by organizations 
needs    
The analysis demonstrates that IOs collectively manage to recognize climate change 
migrants. While the UNHCR does not, the IOM and Nansen Initiative formally recognize their 
needs within their guiding institutional arrangements. 
 
5.5.5 Assessment of Knowledge 
 
Table 3 Action of Support-- Knowledge Creation and Sharing about Climate Change 
Migrants 
 
Organization Rating Explanation (research, publications, reports) 
   
UNHCR * Publishes reports which include information regarding 
  migrants whose status is unclear 
   
Nansen Initiative ** Publishes reports regarding regional consultations. Spreads 
  knowledge generated by other organizations 
   
IOM ** Conducts and publishes extensive research regarding all 
  migration concerns 
   
WIM __ Does provide an impetus for research in its workplan.  Does 
  not currently have means to conduct its own 
   
Assessment of ** The challenges are rapidly evolving and requires a growing 
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needs  body of knowledge but the means for such research is 
  available 
   
 
 
This analysis further demonstrates that IOs are sufficiently generating and spreading 
knowledge about climate change migrants and their needs. The IOM in particular generates a 
great deal of knowledge while the Nansen Initiative’s strength lies in spreading the knowledge 
generated by other organizations. 
 
 
 
5.5.6 Assessment of Direct Support for Well-being 
 
Table 4 Action for Support-- Direct Assistance for Climate Change Migrants: Emergency 
Habitability 
 
Organization Rating Examples: Improve and rebuild damaged infrastructure, 
   
UNHRC -- No efforts 
   
Nansen Initiative -- No efforts 
   
IOM ** ^^Promotes “Water, Sanitation, and Hygene” programmes; 
  shelter assistance (IOM, 2014, n.d.-f) 
   
WIM -- No efforts 
   
Assessment of ** The IOM provides a variety of emergency services within 
needs  devastated areas 
   
 
 
The IOM manages to provide a wide range of emergency aid which supports habitability. 
 
Some of these emergency efforts may also have long lasting effects, such as the 
Water, Sanitation, and Hygene (WASH) programmes. 
 
Table 5 Action for Support-- Direct Assistance for Climate Change Migrants: Long Term 
Habitability 
 
Organization Rating Examples: Sea walls, crop insurance, utility supply 
   
UNHRC -- No efforts for climate change migrants, although it does 
  promote domestic energy programmes which supports “other 
  people of concern” (UNHCR, 2014b) 
   
Nansen Initiative -- No efforts 
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IOM ** ^^Promotes “Water, Sanitation, and Hygene” programmes; 
  Shelter assistance,  (IOM, 2014, n.d.-f) 
   
WIM -- No efforts 
   
Assessment of * The IOM provides a variety of services but lack long term risk 
needs  sharing strategies like crop insurance (closest effort would be 
  financial support for microenterprise) (IOM, 2014) 
   
Gap  Long term risk sharing strategies 
    
^^ The IOM’s WASH and Shelter services occur in affected zones serving both emergencies 
and long term needs 
 
 
 
The IOM manages to meet most long term needs regarding habitability. However, a gap 
exists regarding long term risk sharing strategies. Crop insurance, for example, is one form of 
risk sharing which allows communities to remain in their place of origin rather than seeking work 
elsewhere during or after poor crop yields. 
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Table 6 Action for Support-- Direct Assistance for Climate Change Migrants: Emergency 
Migration Assistance 
 
Organization Rating Examples: Evacuation, return transportation 
   
UNHRC -- No efforts, but will evacuate and assist with repatriation for 
  refugees (UNHCR, 2014b) 
   
Nansen Initiative -- No efforts 
   
IOM ** Evacuation and return transportation ((IOM, 2015d, n.d.-a) 
   
WIM -- No efforts 
   
Assessment of ** The IOM provides both emergency evacuation and return 
needs  transportation 
   
 
 
The IOM manages to support migrants during emergency situations, like evacuating 
 
before and after extreme weather events. 
 
 
Table 7 Action for Support-- Direct Assistance for Climate Change Migrants: Long Term 
Migration Assistance 
 
Organization Rating Examples: Enhanced mobility, identification of a viable home, 
  legal aid 
UNHRC -- No efforts, but will assist refugees with placement, visas, and 
  legal status (UNHCR, n.d.-d) 
   
Nansen Initiative -- No efforts but aims to achieve policy and legal solutions 
   
IOM ** Enhanced mobility, identification of a viable home, legal aid 
  (IOM, n.d.-e) 
WIM -- No efforts 
   
Assessment of ** The IOM provides a variety of assistance programs 
needs   
   
 
 
The IOM manages to assist migrants in identifying new places of residence and 
resettlement. In terms of climate change specific events, the IOM is starting a pilot program 
which resettles coastal communities vulnerable to sea level rise. 
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Table 8 Action for Support-- Direct Assistance for Climate Change Migrants: Emergency 
Post-Migration Support 
 
Organization Rating Examples: Emergency food and healthcare, relief camps 
   
UNHRC -- No efforts, but will assist refugees in a variety of ways 
  (UNHCR, 2014b) 
Nansen Initiative -- No efforts 
   
IOM ** Emergency food supplies, Water, sanitation, hygiene, 
  healthcare, shelter, family tracing, (IOM, 2014) 
   
WIM -- No efforts 
   
Assessment of ** The IOM provides a variety of assistance programs 
needs   
   
 
 
The IOM provides a variety of post-migration support strategies within the context of 
emergency situations. While these support strategies may not be durable solutions for long term 
needs, the IOM demonstrates that IOs recognize a range of important strategies to meet the 
various needs of migrants during extreme, emergency events. 
 
 
 
Table 9 Action for Support-- Direct Assistance for Climate Change Migrants: Long Term 
Post-Migration Support 
 
Organization Rating Examples: Skill-training, secure housing, mental and physical 
  healthcare (including conceptualizing/compensating loss), legal 
  aid, 
   
UNHRC -- No efforts, but will assist refugees in a variety of ways (UNHCR, 
  2014b) 
Nansen Initiative -- No efforts 
   
IOM ** Healthcare and screening, water, sanitation, hygiene, 
  education, livelihood support, integration support, visa 
  assistance (IOM, 2014) 
   
WIM -- No efforts 
   
Assessment of ** The IOM provides a variety of assistance 
needs   
   
Gap  Psychological healthcare and conceptualizing/compensating 
  loss 
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The IOM again utilizes a variety of strategies to meet the long-term needs of migrants. 
However, a gap exists in meeting the psychological needs of migrants who experience loss. As 
the interviews from Chapter 4 demonstrate, climate change may cause migrants to experience 
profound loss such as culture, heritage, and identity. While other events such as war may also 
cause migrants to experience these non-economic losses, our ability to anticipate climate change 
allows scholars and policy-makers to proactively reduce or relieve these experiences of loss. 
While private or state-level organizations may exists to provide psychological care, the IOM— 
which is the primary organization to meet on the ground needs of climate change migrants—
does not currently utilize psychological care strategies to relieve non-economic forms of loss. 
 
The IOM, Nansen Initiative, and the UNHCR represent three international organizations 
which utilize a range of institutional strategies for states to collectively meet climate change 
migrants’ needs, This assessment shows that two strategic gaps exist: risk sharing strategies like 
crop insurance, and psychological care to relieve non-economic forms of loss. Furthermore, 
examining the structure and functions of each organization shows that international organizations, 
like the WIM, may be limited by the agendas and will of individual states. In order to meet the 
needs of future migrants, states need to implement strategies which address the existing gaps in 
direct support strategies. The nature of climate change allows states to collectively anticipate 
such needs and reflect on the values and principles which they chose to protect over time. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
International organizations have played an integral role in assisting migrants since the 
 
1950’s with the birth of the UNHCR and the IOM. Yet, IOs have not always succeeded in fulfilling 
all migrants’ needs. This poses serious questions for determining how states will collectively 
manage even more challenges in the future as climate change exacerbates migration. This 
assessment demonstrates international organizations utilize three primary strategies in order to 
meet migrants’ needs: formally recognizing the problem, creating and spreading knowledge, and 
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providing direct support. By assessing three migration organizations—the UNHCR, the Nansen 
Initiative, and the IOM— the goals of each organization become clear as well as specific gaps 
in strategies. 
 
The framework assessment demonstrates that climate change migrants are successfully 
recognized and studied within an international setting. First, the three migration organizations 
demonstrate that climate change migrants are formally recognized within an international setting. 
Utilizing the assessment framework however, highlights that the UNHCR is limited in assisting 
climate change migrants because it does not fulfill this specific strategy. Second, these 
organizations successfully demonstrate means to create and spread knowledge about climate 
change migrants. While the IOM especially emphasizes a wide range of empirical research 
regarding migrants, the other organizations create and spread some additional knowledge. 
While these two strategies are collectively fulfilled, examining how organizations do or do not 
utilize these strategies highlights the goals and purposes of each organization. 
 
Furthermore, the framework assessment demonstrated that most types of emergency 
and long term needs of migrants are addressed by these organizations. However, two key 
strategies remain unaddressed: risk sharing strategies like crop insurance, and long-term 
psychological care to help migrants cope with loss. As climate change increases, the need for 
such strategies may also increase. While the direct support strategies aimed to cover types of 
strategies which protect the well-being of migrants, it is important to note that the assessment 
does not distinguish how or when organizations utilize each strategy. Organizations may not 
always have the means to support all migrants. Furthermore, organizations may not be able to 
implement the full range of appropriate strategies within specific contexts. This is particularly 
relevant for determining if a migrant’s self-determination remains protected. For example, 
migrants may prefer to remain in their original home or they may prefer to migrate to another 
area. While the framework assessment demonstrates that a range these types of strategies 
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exist, it does not highlight whether or not organizations make migrants’ preferred 
options available to them. 
 
Furthermore, examining the functions and structure of each organization helped to 
uncover ways in which each organization might be limited by states’ interests. The agency of 
these organizations is, at times, restricted by trade-offs between supporting migrants and 
upholding the sovereignty of states. For example, the UNHCR illustrates this principle by not 
requiring any state to actually accept refugees into their borders. It further prioritizes states by 
rejecting the notion that climate change migrants should qualify under its Convention. As one 
expert expressed “providing refugee [status] might be a way, but a very unlikely one I think-- even 
more unlikely than money” (7). The IOM also expresses this trade-off by deferring to national 
interests rather than prioritizing humanitarian needs. International organizations whose success 
depends on states to agree may ultimately have limited capacity to fulfill their purpose. The 
Nansen Initiative, however, demonstrates a model which may prove to resolve inter-state conflict. 
As one expert claimed, “you need to have team spirit, it's extremely important” (personal 
communication, 2015). While this remark was in regards to climate negotiations, the sentiment 
may hold true for migration organizations too. The Nansen Initiative aims to do this by 
transcending tricky political processes. By omitting legally binding jargon, states can collaborate 
to achieve regional and global solutions. However, it is important to note that while the Nansen 
Initiative appears successful so far, only time will tell if its alternative approach to legally-binding 
agreements yields viable results. 
 
Ultimately, the assessment of international migration organizations demonstrated a need 
for organizations to implement additional strategies in order to address the range of needs which 
climate change migrants have. Migration organizations could potentially address these strategies 
alone or perhaps collaborate with the WIM in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Actions of International Organizations to Fulfill Migrants’ Needs and Promote Well-Being 
 
1. Recognize the Problem  
(e.g. Institutional/Organizational development and reform) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Create and Share Knowledge  
(e.g. Research, reports, and publications) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Directly Support Migrants 
 
Strategy Temporal Conditions Examples Target Communities 
     
A. Promote Emergency Improve and rebuild Those who endure 
 Habitability  damaged infrastructure, extreme weather 
   emergency utility supply events like 
    hurricanes 
  Long term Sea walls, crop Those who face 
   insurance, long term slow onset events 
   utility supply like sea-level rise 
    and desertification 
     
B. Migration Emergency Evacuation, return Those who must 
 Assistance  transportation temporarily 
    evacuate due to 
    extreme weather 
    events 
  Long term Enhanced mobility, Those who migrate 
   identification of a viable as an adaptation 
   home, legal aid strategy or are 
    forced to leave 
    permanently 
C.  Post- Emergency Emergency food and Those who 
 Migration  healthcare, relief camps temporarily 
 Support   evacuate due to 
    extreme weather 
    events 
  Long term Skill-training, secure Those who migrate 
   housing, mental and as an adaptation 
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  physical healthcare strategy or are 
  (including conceptualizing forced to leave 
  loss), legal aid, permanently 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Scholars have, for several decades, been intrigues by migration induced by 
environmental changes. In 1985, El-Hinnawi published a foundational article in this field, titled 
 
Environmental Refugees. Since then, scholars have debated definitions and labels for 
environmental migrants. Scholars have also debated legal strategies, such as the Refugee 
Convention, and on the ground support strategies, like assisted migration, in order to identify 
ways to address the needs of environmental migrants. Since El-Hinnawi’s 1985 publication, 
states and scholars have achieved some progress. For example, the Nansen Initiative developed 
as a distinct attempt to recognize the needs of climate change migrants in ways which the 
UNHCR does not. Also, scholars have produced a great deal of knowledge about environmental 
migrants, particularly in regard to non-economic forms of loss caused by climate change. Yet, 30 
years later environmental migration continues to be an important area of concern. This is, in part, 
due to states’ struggles to collectively meet the various existing and future needs of migrants. 
Also, climate change stands to exacerbate migration around the world, causing more people to 
migrate in coming years and demanding improved strategies to manage the breadth of migrants’ 
needs. 
 
Science tells us that climate change impacts will increase in coming years (IPCC, 2013). 
These impacts pose a multitude of challenges which states must collectively address, one of 
which being human migration. This begs the question of how well prepared society is to 
sustainably manage the needs of future migrants. In order to explore the answer to this question, 
I utilized two techniques to understand how states might collectively meet the needs of migrants, 
 
particularly for those who live in states which lack the capacity to manage climate change impacts 
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and must rely on international support. First, I interviewed experts who study the development of 
the WIM in order to learn what opportunities and concerns might shape the mechanism’s future 
capacity to address the needs of climate change migrants. Second, I assessed existing 
international migration organizations to understand how they currently address climate change 
migrant’s needs, as well as entry points to improve their efforts. How we collectively choose to 
anticipate and respond to such needs will shape the course of history and define our values as a 
species. 
 
6.2 The Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage associated with 
climate change impacts 
 
 
 
The WIM, established in 2013, is still taking shape. While migration is one of nine 
themes for the WIM to discuss in its two-year development plan, no one quite knows how it 
might address migration or even loss and damage in general. In order to explore the WIM’s 
potential, I interviewed 11 experts who are knowledgeable about loss and damage but approach 
the topic from a wide range of backgrounds. Experts conveyed ideas about the significance of 
loss and damage, what they think the WIM is and might become, and concerns for the future 
progress of the mechanism. They frequently formulated these ideas using concepts of fairness, 
equity, and justice. These concepts ultimately shaped how experts understood the purpose of 
the WIM in addressing climate change migration. 
 
Experts conveyed ideas that not all forms of loss are equal. Some forms of loss may 
pose difficult challenges, while other forms of loss, like loss of state and identity, may feel 
catastrophic. Furthermore, experts argued that vulnerable countries, where people lack the 
capacity to cope with climate change impacts, will experience more loss; addressing these 
countries’ needs should be the focus of the WIM. Not only do these countries stand to lose more, 
but they are often the least responsible for causing climate change. 
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Experts further articulated that the current function of the WIM is to recognize loss and 
damage is already happening, increase knowledge about loss and damage, and also open space 
for countries to collectively manage loss and damage in a way that is fair. Experts felt that the 
WIM will ultimately serve to recognize and promote dialog about how such loss and damage 
disproportionately affects the most disadvantaged state. Doing so may involve discussions of 
liability and compensation in order to partially restore what developing countries may lose due to 
climate change impacts. 
 
Experts further shared concerns about the development of the WIM. They felt that 
achieving a greater sense of fairness, equity, and justice in the world would be very difficult and 
may not fully be realized in the negotiations. Experts argued that the negotiation processes 
divide developed and developing countries. Such competition of interests may prevent or 
postpone the WIM from achieving greater outcomes such as funds for restoration or pathways 
to prevent and mitigate future loss and damage. 
 
In terms of climate change migration, experts highlighted non-economic losses, such as 
culture, heritage, identity, and statehood. They generally perceived the WIM as a tool to 
somehow address these types of loss which migrants experience. One possible avenue to 
alleviate such loss might be collaboration between the WIM and other existing organizations 
like the IOM. 
 
Interviews with experts ultimately demonstrated that climate change carries an obligation 
for states to address global inequalities. The WIM poses a potential avenue for addressing these 
inequalities. The losses which climate change migrants incur are one way in which climate 
change exacerbates global inequalities and states must collectively address these losses in 
some way. 
 
6.3 Assessment of International Migration Organizations 
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International organizations attempt to protect the well-being of climate change migrants 
in a number of ways, such as formally recognizing the problems they face, producing and sharing 
knowledge about those problems, and providing direct support to address their short and long 
term needs. In order to understand what types of needs these organizations may or may not 
already address, I assessed the functions and practices of three intergovernmental migration 
organizations: the UNHCR, the Nansen Initiative, and the IOM. The assessment I used highlights 
the breadth of climate change migrants’ needs and also clarifies what the actual goals of each 
organization are. 
 
The assessment demonstrated that these three organizations have strategies in place to 
address most types of needs. However, two particular gaps exist: risk sharing strategies like crop 
insurance, and long term psychological care for those who experience profound loss. 
Furthermore, evaluating how these organizations function illustrated that they face similar political 
limitations as the WIM. These organizations require funding from states and their effectiveness in 
providing support for migrants may be limited by the individual interests of states. 
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
This research highlights challenges and needs of migrants which states must address in 
order to sustainably manage climate change migration. By analyzing both the WIM and 
international migration organizations, this research demonstrates ways in which both 
organizations might improve their efforts. The WIM contributes ideas about what types of 
strategies migration organizations should consider in order to cope with loss and damage from 
climate change. Also, migration organizations provide insight into potential strategies for the WIM 
to consider as the mechanism moves forward and negotiators decipher the most affective actions 
for the WIM to formulate. Furthermore, these two methods emphasized two key lessons 
regarding how we might meet migrants’ needs: the significance of cooperation between states, 
and the breadth of strategies which organizations must address. 
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Oftentimes, migrants live in vulnerable states which do not have the capacity to fully 
address these needs. Support for migrants thus comes from international organizations which 
states around the world collectively manage. However, the interests of individual states may limit 
these organizations’ ability to meet migrants’ needs. The WIM faces similar limitations. While 
migration organizations aim to meet the needs of vulnerable migrants, the WIM aims to address 
the needs of vulnerable states. Yet, the success of the WIM may depend on cooperation 
between states in order for them to collectively address historical inequalities and the impacts of 
climate change. One important challenge for policymakers to acknowledge and address in order 
to meet the needs of climate change migrants is, therefore, cooperation amongst states. In order 
to achieve a sustainable future, states must recognize the values and principles which they 
practice and evaluate those principles to affectively address the well-being of migrants. 
 
Furthermore, evaluating both the WIM and international migration organizations 
highlighted the opportunities available to anticipate the growing needs of migrants. Climate 
change impacts already exist, however, research shows that climate change impacts will likely 
increase over time (IPCC, 2013). Evaluating the migration organizations demonstrated risk 
sharing strategies and long term psychological care needs to be implemented in order to further 
promote the well-being of migrants. While experts generally do not expect the WIM to provide 
direct support to migrants, the WIM could assist states or other organizations in fulfilling these 
needs. For example, the WIM might be a source of funding for crop insurance. Also, the WIM is 
currently an impetus for new research and discussions regarding loss and damage which 
migration organizations may utilize. The WIM may act to prevent some future loss, or it might 
collaborate with migration organizations in some way in order to manage psychological care for 
migrants. 
 
While the future remains unclear, numerous options exist for states and organizations to 
meet these challenges and support the needs of climate change migrants. One specific option for the 
WIM to consider is to create a forum for those who incur profound loss to share their 
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experience. As Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have already demonstrated, the ability to 
share one’s experience of pain and loss may provide some relief. Such a forum could further 
contribute to a research database which would allow additional progress in learning best 
practices to prevent and manage profound loss, including loss which climate change migrants 
experience. Finally, this could lead to a permanent institution which serves as a reminder of the 
hardships, experiences, and choices which shape human history. 
 
Another policy option to consider is negotiating liability and compensation alongside 
support strategies which do not hinge on proving guilt or require large amounts of funds. For 
instance, the WIM could negotiate how states meet urgent challenges in two overlapping 
phases. Since proving liability could prolong negotiations, starting with regional agreements 
which emphasize synergy between states could produce fast and effective, although potentially 
limited results. For example, regions might be able to agree on strategies which improve cross-
border mobility for migrants or pool resources to collectively reduce risk from drought or other 
disasters. Meanwhile, climate science will improve and provide proof of liability. Lengthier, 
controversial agreements can slowly take meaningful shape and eventually fill in gaps which 
regional agreements could not achieve. 
 
This research aimed to bring light to the challenges which states must address in order to 
protect the well-being of climate change migrants. However, this research does not provide an in 
depth analysis of the multitude of factors which inhibit action within organizations or prevent 
solutions from being realized. Further, the organizational assessment only acknowledges the 
types of needs which climate change migrants may have, but does not evaluate how or when 
each of these needs are met within under all circumstance. Finally, this thesis does not weigh the 
costs and benefits of different trade-offs for achieving long term needs of migrants within a broad 
systems framework. 
 
Ultimately policy-makers, states, and the general public must find solutions which protect 
 
the quality of life for present and future generations. Climate change will bring many new 
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challenges. Along with these challenges though, climate change brings new opportunities through 
international institutions like the UNFCCC to make progress in addressing the needs of climate 
change migrants. Unlike some natural disasters, climate change provides us the opportunity to 
anticipate changes and plan accordingly. We have the foresight, and thus an obligation to prepare for 
these challenges to the best of our abilities. Doing so will require meeting the needs of climate change 
migrants and answering tough questions about profound loss. 
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Background 
 
 How would you describe your work as it relates to the 
WIM? Characterization of the WIM

 How would you describe the purpose of the WIM?
 What do you believe were the main drivers that lead to the creation of the WIM?
 What goals do you hope the WIM will achieve?
o Protection of human rights 
o Distributive justice 
o Restorative justice 
 Do you believe the WIM will be able to achieve these goals?
 In your opinion, what strategies should the WIM use in order to achieve these 
these goals?
o Financial 
o Capacity building 
o Technology sharing 
 Are there potential strategies you believe will be ineffective or stall progress?
 Are there types of communities or populations that the WIM might benefit most?
o Environmental migrants 
o SIDS 
o LDCs 
 Are there communities or populations who might be excluded from these benefits?
o Those affected by slow onset disasters  
o Those affected by sudden disasters 
o Internally displaced 
o Internationally displaced 
o Populations in developed countries 
 
Additional: 
 
 Do you have any additional comments?
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
RECRUITMENT SCRIPT 
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[Email Script] 
 
 
I am a master of arts student in the School of Sustainability at Arizona State University. I 
am studying the UNFCCC’s Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage as a part of 
my thesis. I am conducting expert interviews in order to explore how negotiators, scholars and 
researchers understand the goals and functions of the mechanism. 
 
I am contacting you to see if you would be available and willing to be interviewed for my 
research project, given the leadership role you have played in shaping the mechanism itself or 
the current discussions about the loss and damage. The interview should not take more than 30 
minutes of your time. I will primarily conduct interviews between January 5-20, 2015, however, I 
can schedule an interview at a date and time of your convenience. Interviews will be conducted 
via Skype. 
 
Your participation in this study is of course voluntary. If you grant permission, I would like to 
audiotape the interview to ensure accuracy in my research. The tapes will be erased one year after 
the completion of this research, after I have accurately transcribed the interviews. If you have any 
questions concerning the research study, please email me at kmthom20@asu.edu. 
 
Please let me know by responding to this email if you are willing to be interviewed, and the 
best way I can reach you for this purpose. 
 
[Phone script]: Would you be interested in being interviewed? Yes/ No 
 
 
[No]: That is fine, I perfectly understand. Thank you for your time! 
 
 
[Yes]  Thank you very much. When would it be convenient for you to do the interview? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
VERBAL CONSENT 
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[Following acceptance of interview 
request] Me: 
 
Thank you very much for being willing to be interviewed. 
 
 
 
Before we begin, I’d like to go over some formalities. As I mentioned when I first contacted you, 
this project is apart of my master’s thesis research and may be submitted to journals for 
publication or presented in a public forum. While I will not associate specific statements to your 
name or position in those outputs, I would like to include you on a general list as one of the 
individuals we consulted in this project. Why would you want to exclude the possibility of citing 
your experts? 
 
 
 
1) Do you agree to having your name and organization listed in this way in project 
documents? YES or NO. 
 
 
2) Is it ok if I audiotape this interview? I will retain the audiotape for one year so as to ensure 
we have accurately recorded the opinions and ideas you express in the interview. YES or 
NO. 
 
 
As a reminder, the interview is completely voluntary and you can stop at any time you wish, or 
not answer any questions that you would prefer not to. 
 
 
 
Do you have any questions for me before we get started? 
 
 
 
Are you ready to begin? 
 
 
 
YES or NO 
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